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This thesis work analyzes the performance of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) data received from Grand Forks International Airport, detects 
anomalies in the data and quantifies the associated potential risk. This work also assesses 
severity associated anomalous data in Detect and Avoid (DAA) for Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS). The received data were raw and archived in GDL-90 format. A python 
module is developed to parse the raw data into readable data in a .csv file. The anomaly 
detection algorithm is based on Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) ADS-B 
performance assessment report.  An extensive study is carried out on two main types of 
anomalies, namely dropouts and altitude deviations. A dropout is considered when the 
update rate exceeds three seconds. Dropouts are of different durations and have a different 
level of risk depending on how much time ADS-B is unavailable as the surveillance system. 
Altitude deviation refers to the deviation between barometric and geometric altitude. 
Deviation ranges from 25 feet to 600 feet have been observed. As of now, barometric 
altitude has been used for separation and surveillance while geometric altitude can be used 
in cases where barometric altitude is not available. Many UAS might not have both sensors 
installed on board due to size and weight constrains. There might be a chance of 
misinterpretation of vertical separation specially while flying in National Airspace (NAS) 
if the ownship UAS and intruder manned aircraft use two different altitude sources for 
separation standard. The characteristics and agreement between two different altitudes is 
xv 
 
investigated with a regression based approach.  Multiple risk matrices are established based 
on the severity of the DAA well clear.  ADS-B is called the Backbone of FAA Next 
Generation Air Transportation System, NextGen. NextGen is the series of inter-linked 
programs, systems, and policies that implement advanced technologies and capabilities. 
ADS-B utilizes the Satellite based Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to provide 
the pilot and the Air Traffic Control (ATC) with more information which enables an 
efficient navigation of aircraft in increasingly congested airspace. FAA mandated all 
aircraft, both manned and unmanned, be equipped with ADS-B out by the year 2020 to fly 
within most controlled airspace. As a fundamental component of NextGen it is crucial to 






An analysis of the performance of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
data received from Grand Forks International Airport was carried out to understand its’ 
vulnerabilities and recognize the effects on present and future Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
operation. At present unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and autonomous air traffic control 
(ATC) towers being integrated into the aviation industry[1]. As a fundamental component 
of future surveillance system, the anomalies and vulnerabilities of ADS-B system need to 
be identified for a fully utilized airspace with enhanced situational awareness. This work 
is partially funded by ASSURE [2], an alliance of universities across the United States by 
the Federal Aviation Administration for System Safety of UAS. The initial findings fed 
into the Surveillance Critically Research group and the expanded work is presented in this 
study.  
 
1.1 Motivation  
 
In order to meet increasing air travel demand, airspace capacity must be increased, which 
in turn depends to a large extent on the ATC technology, the capability of ATC and 
associated functions to manage the airspace. One way of increasing airspace capacity is to 
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reduce the required separation minima between aircraft, which demands very high 
performance (accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability) of the navigation and 
associated functions of communications and surveillance. Reducing the separation between 
aircraft to increase airspace capacity, without considering the constraints will cause an 
increase in the risk of collision. To overcome the limitations and to meet the future air 
travel demand, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [3] established a 
special committee on Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) to develop a plan and 
program for future air traffic [4]. As a result, a new surveillance technology referred to as 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) was proposed by the ICAO and is 
envisioned to fill the gaps in the current surveillance systems. Figure 1 provides a visual 
interpretation how air traffic is tracked in real time using ADS-B data and Figure 2 provides 
onboard ADS-B traffic display. Air traffic around Grand Forks are shown in real time on 
map in Figure 1. Upon clicking on aircraft sign, the flight information as well as the 
trajectory can be seen.  
 




Figure 2:GARMIN Onboard ADS-B Traffic Display [6] 
 
However, the display onboard is different in the sense that it can identify the potential threat 
and provides more clear traffic scenario. In Figure 2, the blue aircraft sign indicating the 
ownship, the traffics are shown with two different range. From the Figure three aircraft are 
found within 2 NM. The number indicates the flight level, for example -16 means the 
aircraft is flying 16000 feet below the ownship.  
In line with this, the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) [1] and 
EUROCONTROL’s Single European Sky (SES) and its ATM Research (SESAR) program 
[7] recognize ADS-B as key to the respective goals to modernize the ATC operations and 
address the limitations in the current surveillance systems. ICAO envisages that the ADS-
B system should resolve the problems faced in the current surveillance systems. Hence, 
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ADS-B is critical to the requirements to accommodate the increase in air travel demand in 
the future. The UAS in the NAS, is expected to be integrated without reducing existing 
capacity, decreasing safety, negatively impacting current operators. NextGen envisioned 
to contribute capabilities designed to reduce technical barriers related to safety and 
operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. One of 
the main focus of UAS in NAS project is to assess how planned NextGen separation 
assurance systems, with different functional allocations, perform for UAS in mixed 
operations with manned aircraft and the applicability to UAS and the performance of 
NASA NextGen separation assurance systems in flight tests with realistic latencies and 
uncertain trajectories [8]. Figure 3 represents a conceptual architecture of side by side 
operation UAS and manned aircraft in the NAS. 
 
 




It should be noted that only in the United States ADS-B works in two distinct frequencies 
one is 1090ES, and another is 978 MHz. Among them 1090ES is of international standard 
and aircraft must be equipped with 1090ES transponder in order to fly above the transition 
altitude. On the other hand, 978MHz datalink is used by General Aviation only in United 
States Airspace except Class A. According to Minimal Operational Performance Standard 
for UAS [9], UAS needs to be equipped with UAT ADS-B to fly within NAS. Though a 
lot study has found on the 1090ES ADS-B system, however, UAT ADS-B lacks addressing 
the important questions regarding limitations, failure modes including their 
characterization, modeling, and assessment of impacts. This is probably because UAT is 
newer comparative to 1090ES and only used in USA. Therefore, an in-detail study 
mentioning and recognizing the anomalies and its effect on safe operation especially when 
UAS will engulf NAS is needed to ensure uninterrupted operation in any operational 
environment to support the ATC surveillance. 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Given, the motivation above the aim of this thesis is to assess the vulnerabilities of UAT 
ADS-B messages, discuss and identify the failure mode and quantify the risk in UAS 
operation. The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses ATC operation in the past, present and future. It introduces 
surveillance sensors and systems used in ATC, their performances, limitations, and 
applications. It also contains a broad overview of ADS-B system and its potential of serving 
ATC in the near future.  
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Chapter 3 provides ADS-B message definition from RTCA DO-282B, data extraction, 
and sorting methods. This chapter discusses message inspection steps, definitions of 
anomalies. The anomalies observed are introduced in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 contains an in-depth analysis of two principle type of anomalies namely dropout 
and altitude discrepancy. These two anomalies are observed more frequently and 
considered more severe as they have direct and immediate impacts on the airspace safety. 
Chapter 5 presents some hypothetical geometric encounter between UAS and Manned 
aircraft to understand the severity and hazard associated with ADS-B data anomalies on 
UAS. The encounters are designed to bring out the highest possible hazard and risk that 
could take place in the presence of anomalies. 
Chapter 6 connects the anomalies to potential reasons with a system level assessment that 
leads to the anomaly. The system level assessment follows a top-down architecture starts 
from the main event and goes all the down to all subsystems that individually or 
collectively responsible for the failure. This chapter also incorporates barometric and 
geometric altitude to a measurement system comparison model with a weighted deming 
regression model, in order to assess if these two-system data can be modeled 
mathematically.  




BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF ADS-B 
 
This chapter provides a background of the air traffic control surveillance systems. It 
describes the ATC operations, systems used for the surveillance, their performance, and 
limitations. It highlights slow shifting of ATC towards cooperative surveillance systems 
and the evolution of NextGen. Also, this chapter contains a detailed overview of the ADS-
B system architecture and past studied and contemporaray researches on this field.  
 
2.1 Background of ATC Surveillance System 
The world of air traffic is slowly shifting towards the cooperative surveillance system from 
the non-cooperative system. Surveillance plays an important role in ATC to accurately and 
reliably determine the location of aircraft, which has a direct influence on the separation 
distances required between aircraft and therefore on how efficiently a given airspace may 
be utilized. The demand of increased flexibility for airspace users by reducing restrictions 
associated with flying along fixed routes requires improved navigation capability onboard 
the aircraft. Equally, accurate surveillance is required to assist in the detection and 
resolution of any potential conflicts associated with the flexible use of the airspace which 
is likely to result in a more dynamic environment [10]. International Civil Aviation 
organization listed some parameters in order to characterize any surveillance system. The  
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chararacteriscts is as follow[10] : 
i. Coverage volume – the volume of airspace in which the system operates to 
specifications 
ii. Accuracy – a measure of the difference between the estimated and true position of 
an aircraft. 
iii. Integrity – an indication that the aircraft’s estimated position is within a stated 
containment volume of its true position. Integrity includes the concept of an alarm 
will be generated if this ceases to be the case, within a defined time to alarm. 
Integrity can be used to indicate whether the system is operating normally. 
iv. Update rate – the rate at which the aircraft’s position is updated to users. 
v. Reliability – the probability that the system will continue operating to specification 
within a defined period. Sometimes this is called continuity. 
vi. Availability – the percentage of the total operating time during which the system is 
performing to specification. 
Also, ICAO stated some other issues which need to be considered when designing a 
surveillance system for ATC. According to ICAO surveillance system guidance materials 
[10] they are: 
i. The ability to uniquely identify targets. 
ii.  The impact of the loss of surveillance of individual aircraft both in the short (few 
seconds) and long-term. 
iii. The impact of the loss of surveillance over an extended area. 




v. The ability to operate to specification with the expected traffic density. 
vi. The ability to operate in harmony with other systems such as the Traffic  
Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) and Airborne Separation Assistance 
Systems (ASAS). 
vii. The ability to obtain Aircraft Derived Data (ADD). 
viii. The interaction between communication, navigation, and surveillance functions. 
Today’s surveillance systems can be classified into two broad categories. One is Ground-
based, and another is airborne. The ground-based surveillance system is mostly consisting 
of different RADAR and beacon. ADS-B is an airborne surveillance system which make 
use of satellite navigation such as GPS for generating surveillance information. Table 1 
illustrates the application of two different systems in ATC. 






a) ATC surveillance in airspace with radar coverage  
b) ATC surveillance in airspace without radar coverage  
c) Airport surface surveillance  
d) Aircraft derived data for ground-based ATM tools.  
Airborne System  a) Situational awareness  
     Enhanced traffic situational awareness on the airport surface  
     Enhanced traffic situational awareness during flight operations  
     Enhanced successive visual approaches  
b) Airborne spacing and separation  





Radar provides the air traffic control with an accurate and trustworthy on-screen plan view 
of the aircraft position in real-time [10]. The required separation between aircraft for safe 
operation can be greatly reduced in comparison to the procedural separation. There are two 
main kinds of radar: one is Primary Surveillance Radar, and another is Secondary 
Surveillance Radar. Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) transmits a high-power signal 
which is reflected by the aircraft back to the radar. The radar determines the aircraft’s 
position in the form of range calculating the elapsed time between transmission and 
reception of the reflected signal. The direction of the aircraft is the direction in which the 
narrow beam radar antenna is facing. Primary radar does not provide the identity or the 
altitude of the aircraft. Also, it does not require any specific equipment on the aircraft. 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) systems consist of two main elements, a ground-
based interrogator/receiver, and an aircraft transponder. The aircraft’s transponder 
responds to interrogations from the ground station, enabling the aircraft’s range and bearing 
from the ground station to be determined. The development of Secondary Surveillance 
Radar evolved from military Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems which allowed the 
use of the Mode A/C service for civil aviation. Since then it has been significantly 
developed to include the Mode S service. SSR frequencies of 1030 and 1090 MHz remain 
shared with the military. In many cases, SSR is co-located with the primary radar, usually 
with the SSR mounted on the top of the primary radar antenna. Mode A/C transponders 
provide identification (Mode A code) and altitude (Mode C) data with 100 feet resolution 





2.1.2 Mode S Transponder 
Mode S is an improved version of Mode A/C. It contains all the functions of Mode A/C 
and allows selective addressing of targets by the use of unique 24-bit aircraft addresses, 
and a two-way data link between the ground station and aircraft for the exchange of 
information. It also provides the transponder capability to report altitude data with 25 feet 
resolution although accuracy and resolution also depend on the altitude sensor systems on 
board the aircraft. A Mode S transponder is backward compatible with a conventional SSR 
Mode A/C radar, and the detection and processing of Mode A/C transponder replies are 
essentially identical. To achieve Mode S benefits, the aircraft transponders must be a Mode 
S capable transponder. 
 
2.1.3 ADS-B 
ADS-B is a system that uses transmissions from aircraft to provide geographical position, 
pressure altitude data, positional integrity measures, flight identity, 24-bit aircraft address, 
velocity and other data which have been determined by airborne sensors. Typically, the 
airborne position sensor is a GPS receiver or the GPS output. This sensor must provide 
integrity data that indicates the positional errors containment bound. The altitude sensor is 
typically the same barometric source/air data computer source used for secondary radar. 
There are two different ADS-B systems: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out in aircraft 
collects its state information including 3D position, velocity, and altitude and then 
broadcasts this information to the ground stations and other aircrafts via a data link. There 
are two different data links available; 1090ES which utilize Mode-S transponder, and 
another is 978 MHz Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) channel. Any aircraft equipped 
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with ADS-B In will receive the ADS-B message sent out by other aircraft as well as ground 
stations. Table 2 summarizes the performance parameters for different ATC surveillance 
system. 
Table 2: Surveillance System Performance Comparison [10] 
  
 
The same performance parameters are used to assess different surveillance technologies. 
However, when applied to different technologies, the definition of the parameters may 
change slightly. While ground-based surveillance systems are old, insufficient and slow 
Surveillance System Coverage Accuracy  Integrity 
Primary Radar S-band  
60-80 NM  
L-band 160-220  
NM  
In range: 0.1 NM 
RMS or 0.2 NM 2 σ  
In azimuth: 0.15 
degrees RMS or 0.3 
degrees 2 σ  
No integrity  





In range: 0.03 NM 
RMS  
In azimuth: 0.07 
degrees RMS or 0.14 
degrees 2 σ for 
random errors.  
No integrity  
report provided.  
Mode S 200 NM-250 
NM  
Same as SSR No integrity  
the report provided.  
ADS-B 200 NM-250 
NM  
Determined by the 
aircraft avionics and 
independent of range 
from the sensor.  
Integrity value is 
downlinked in the 
ADS-B message.  
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for today’s fastest moving air traffic, airborne surveillance systems are named as a solution 
to provide an increased level of safety, faster route, and fewer traffic delays.  
 
2.2 NEXTGEN and ADS-B Overview  
 
Over the past several years, airspace has become congested by increasing number of flights. 
The introduction of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace (NAS) 
has further increased the congestion. According to FAA, the use of small unmanned aircraft 
systems (SUAS) for commercial operations has greatly increased in recent years. Not only 
for commercial purpose, hobbyists are also using this platform for various recreational 
activities. Figure 4 provides a statistic of using UAS for commercial purpose as per FAA.  
 
Figure 4: Number of Applications for SUAS Business Use Under Section 333 
 
FAA also states that more than 6,800 airspace waiver requests were submitted for 
operations in controlled airspace by the end of December 2016. While almost half of them 
were for operations in class D airspace (i.e., smaller airports with control towers), other 
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classes were also requested and regularly flown. Figure 5 is the pie chart showing the 
waiver request submitted to FAA till December 2016.  
 
Figure 5: Aerospace Waiver Request 
These statistics of UAS integration in NAS indicate towards a unified airspace for both 
manned and unmanned aircraft. It is a matter of assessment if introducing NextGen can 
provide required safety and reliability for the co-existence of manned and unmanned 
aircraft. Next Generation Air Transportation System in short NextGen is series of inter-
linked programs, systems, and policies that implement advanced technologies and 
capabilities [1]. ADS-B is the backbone of this NextGen program, which utilizes the 
Satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to provide the pilot and Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) with more information which enables an efficient navigation of 
aircraft in the increasingly congested airspace. FAA mandated all aircraft should be 
equipped with ADS-B out by the year 2020 to fly within the most controlled airspace. The 
General Aviation ADS-B Rebate Program [11] is introduced by the FAA to encourage and 
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help owners to equip aircraft with the required avionics for NextGen. The step by step 
initiatives taken by FAA [1] for NextGen are:  
i. Delivering Nationwide Infrastructure: The foundational infrastructure for NextGen 
includes ADS-B that will replace radars as the primary means by which air traffic 
controllers track and manage aircraft [1].  
ii. Delivering Improved Air Traffic Control: En-Route Automation Modernization 
(ERAM) is helping to advance the transition of air traffic control to air traffic 
management by using flying more precise, satellite-based procedures than 
traditional ground-based procedures. 
iii. Delivering Performance Based Navigation: New Performance Based Navigation 
(PBN) procedures use satellite-based precision to fly more direct routes, saving fuel 
and time, increasing traffic flow, and resulting in fewer carbon emissions. 
iv. Delivering Improved Multiple Runway Operations: New separation standards to 
avoid the hazards of wake turbulence are improving the efficiency of aircraft 
arrivals and departures, reducing taxi times, and saving fuel. 
Thus, the satellite-based surveillance system, ADS-B is the core of the NextGen. The next 
section will provide a broad description of the overall ADS-B system. 
 
2.3 Overview of ADS-B 
 
This section introduces the overall ADS-B system and highlights some of the contemporary 




2.3.1 ADS-B infrastructure  
 
RTCA defines [4] ADS-B as a function on an aircraft or a surface vehicle operating within 
the surface movement area that periodically broadcasts its position and other information 
without knowing the recipients and without expecting acknowledgments. The system is 
automatic in the sense that it does not require external intervention to transmit the 
information. It is characterized as a dependent due to its dependence on aircraft navigation 
avionics to obtain the surveillance information. ADS-B is a cooperative system because it 
requires common equipage for aircraft, or vehicles on the airport surface to exchange 
information. It also provides aircraft state information such as horizontal position, altitude, 
vector, velocity and trajectory intent information. A complete ADS-B system architecture 
represented in Figure 6 includes ADS-Out, Ground Stations, ADS-B In, and dual-band data 
links. ADS-B Out uses onboard GPS sensors to calculate position information and velocity. 
Primary altitude information comes from an onboard barometric altimeter. The Air Data 
Computer passes this altitude and altitude rate. A secondary altitude is also available from 
the onboard GPS. The ADS-B message generator then creates the message according to 
the standard. ADS-B has two different well-defined message format as described in RTCA 
DO-260B for 1090ES and RTCA DO-282B for UAT [12]. A ground station includes a 
receiver which relays the message to ATC and sends out some additional report such flight 
information, traffic information to the sender aircraft. Also, it provides a service called 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R) and Traffic Information 
Service-Broadcast (TIS-B). The ADS-R system monitors if there are proximate aircraft 
with differing ADS-B links and then rebroadcast surveillance information received on one 
link frequency to aircraft on the other link frequency. ADS-B In refers to appropriate 
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avionics equipage that can receive, process and display information[13] transmitted via 
ADS-B Out as well as from ground stations. ADS-B In provides the pilot with extended 
situation awareness and self-separation. ADS-B In avionics are capable of receiving and 
decoding ADS-B, ADS-R, and TIS-B messages. The surveillance data processing system 
processes ownship and nearby traffic data. A Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
(CDTI) provides pilots with surveillance information of traffic along with some 





Figure 6: A Complete System Architecture including all the Component, ADS-B Out, ADS-
B In, Datalink and Ground Station 
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As mentioned earlier, ADS-B makes use of two different datalinks; 1090ES and 978MHz. 
Transmissions at 1090ES are supported by secondary surveillance radars (SSRs). The 
existing Mode S signal used for SSR was modified to support ADS-B [13]. The UAT is a 
978MHz data link intend to serve not only ADS-B but also Flight Information Service 
(FIS-B), Traffic Information Service (TIS-B), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Rebroadcast (ADS-R). One of the main differences between these two frequencies is that 
1090 ES is a wideband link and is of international standard, where UAT has narrow 
bandwidth and operated mainly in the-United States’ (US) airspace, except for class A. But 
in terms of data transmission, 978MHz has higher data bandwidth than 1090MHz ES, 
because of less interference and congestion [14]. 
2.3.2 Related work 
 
As one of the fundamental components of NextGen, a lot of research was done and is still 
going on different aspects of ADS-B. This includes but not limited to security and 
verification of messages [15]–[19], experimental attack analysis [20]–[24], data quality 
analysis [25]–[29], safety assessment [4], [30], flight testing [25], [31], [32] etc. ADS-B 
security protocol have been a topic of lot of studies since the system evolution. Having an 
open and known data format, which is broadcast on known frequencies makes the protocol 
highly susceptible to radio frequency (RF) attacks. Attacks can be either passive or active 
and can be initiated from within or outside of the ATC system (e.g. an unauthorized ADS-
B transceiver). Passive attacks include eavesdropping, where the attacker try to listens in 
on periodic ADS-B messages to obtain unique identifiers or position trajectory of 
communicating aircraft without necessarily disrupting the system [17]. Experimental 
attacks were generated and infused to ADS-B messages in order to visualize the severity 
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and find a solution to the potential attacks. Matthias et al. [20] assesses the practicability 
of different threats and quantify the main factors that impact the success of such attacks. 
The results revealed that attacks on ADS-B can be inexpensive and highly successful. 
Various technique was discussed to adopt while verifying original ADS-B messages. These 
include traditional Kalman filtering, Group Validation [17], cryptography [15], Identity-
Based Signature with Batch Verification [33]. Each of the solutions is yet to be 
implemented in the real-time ADS-B network. A handful amount of study was found on 
1090ES ADS-B data assessment describing the data integrity, accuracy, error detected and 
potential risk. Busyairah evaluates ADS-B messages collected from London Terminal Area 
Ground Receiver and describes an assessment framework [4]. This framework provides an 
outline for evaluating 1090ES ADS-B data performance. This involves comparing onboard 
GPS data collected from British Airways with received ADS-B data from ground station 
[29]. As this framework needs both the recorded flight data and ADS-B data for the 
assessment, it is not possible to use this if only ADS-B data is available. Findings of this 
study revealed that often ADS-B failed to assign correct Navigation Integrity Category 
(NIC) and Navigation Accuracy Category for position (NACp) value. Nur et al. [28] 
analyzes 29 aircraft ADS-B data and address deviation between barometric and geometric 
altitude. The deviation was in the range of 25 feet to 1450 feet. This work focused on how 
specific onboard avionics affect the deviation. Zhang [25] conducted a flight test to analyze 
integrity and accuracy of ADS-B data in China. A probabilistic analysis was carried out to 
quantify the risk of different ADS-B failure mode [30]. Several flight tests were conducted 
to check the conformity of the transmitted ADS-B messages with the performance 
standard. Flight inspection report of I90 TRACON/HOUSTON flight test [31], conducted 
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by FAA, relates the lower integrity and accuracy of position information with the lower 
coverage of Satellite Availability and Signal loss. Also, it evaluated the use of the dual data 
link. The CRISTAL-ITP [32] Project by EUROCONTROL, tested to confirm the quality 
of the ADS-B Out information from the reference aircraft regarding update interval and 
accuracy. Although many data evaluation works have been done on 1090ES ADS-B data, 
no study has been found till writing this review on UAT data evaluation available to public. 
One of the reason can be UAT ADS-B is new comparative to 1090ES and only used by 
general aviation aircraft in United States’ airspace. This work is carried out on a large scale 
in comparison to other, which ensures improvement of the result statistically. The other 
studies carried out mostly consider small dataset (one day or few hours) except for Zhang 
et al. [25] which consider one month of data. However, that study was centered on two 
pieces of integrity information from ADS-B data. The work carried out in this thesis is 
novel in a sense that this is the first kind of work that analysis a large volume (one month) 




ANOMALY DETECTION IN ADS-B MESSAGE 
 
This chapter describes step-by-step ADS-B message extraction and identify the 
performance parameters of the ADS-B system. It also provides a structural framework for 
the anomaly detection algorithm and introduces the anomalies that detected through 
inspection. This chapter is the backbone of the study and feeds into analysis conducted in 
chapters four and five. 
3.1 GDL-90 UAT Data 
 
The test data received from UND Aerospace was in GDL-90 format. This is the format of 
the data interface to the serial communication and control panel ports of the Garmin AT 
UAT Data Link Sensor, model GDL 90 [34]. The ground receiver at the Grand Forks 
International Airport is a GDL 90 ADS-B system which is aviation’s first certified ADS-
B datalink transceiver [6]. It is designed to transmit, receive and decode ADS-B messages 
received via 978 MHz datalinks. This system works in two different interfaces, one is 
“Traffic interface”, and another is “Pass-through interface.” Traffic interface when enabled 
by the GDL 90 configuration, provides conflict alerts for proximate traffic that are 
projected to enter the protected zone surrounding the ownship position. On the other hand, 
Pass-through interface does not provide conflict alerts. The output reports under this  
interface consists of the message payloads that are recived over the UAT data link,  without
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modification. Due to constraints on the interface bandwidth, received UAT messages are 
filtered by range from ownship [34]. This study made use of the archived pass-through 
data. There are two Pass-through report messages; one for the Basic UAT message and one 
for the Long UAT message. The difference between basic and long message is that long 
message contains some additional state information. The message structure for basic and 
long UAT is defined in RTCA DO-282B [12]. A python module was developed to decode 
the messages. Section 3.1.1 provides detail description of the message definition and 
development of the extraction algorithm. 
3.1.1. Message Definition  
 
The generic format of GDL-90 datalink message structure is based on "Async HDLC," as 
described in RTCA DO-267 [34]. Figure 7 represents the message structure in data frame. 
The message structure is as follows: 
i. A Flag Byte character (0x7E). 
ii. A one-byte Message-ID which specifies the type of message being transmitted. 
iii. The Message Data, which can be of variable lengths. 
iv. A message Frame Check Sequence (FCS). The FCS is a 16-bit CRC with the least 
significant byte first. 
v. Another Flag Byte character (0x7E). 
 
Figure 7: GDL-90 Message Structure 
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“Byte-stuffing” technique is used to provide the binary transparency. To include a data 
byte that coincides with either a Flag Byte (0x7E) or Control-Escape character (0x7D) 
within a message, each is converted into a unique two-byte sequence. On reception, any 
Control-Escape characters found are discarded, and the following byte is included in the 
message after being converted to its original form by XOR’ing with the value 0x20 [34]. 
The Frame check sequence (FCS) is then calculated on the clear messages. If the calculated 
FCS matched with FCS in messages, the message is authenticated and ready for use. The 
message ID for basic UAT is 3010 and long UAT is 3110. The format of UAT message in 
GDL 90 interface is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3:Message Information and Size 
Basic UAT message Long UAT message 
Byte # Name Size Byte # Name Size 
1 Message ID 1 1 Message ID 1 
2-4 Time of Reception 3 2-4 Time of Reception 3 
5-22 Basic Payload 18 5-38 Long Payload 34 
 Total Length 22  Total Length 38 
 
It should be noted time is not broadcasted with the UAT message. It is found from the 
heartbeat message generated by GDL 90 sensor itself. The message ID for the heartbeat is 
010. This message outputs UAT Time Stamp, in seconds elapsed since UTC midnight 
(0000Z). So, the time stamp for the messages is assigned from the preceded heartbeat 
message. Each basic and long UAT message frame is known as the Payload. The 
information encoded in the frame is called payload element. Each transmitted ADS-B 
message contains a payload that the receiver first identifies by the “Payload Type Code” 
encoded in the first 5 bits of the payload [12]. “Payload Type Code” for basic and long 
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messages are 0 and 1 respectively. The composition of ADS-B payload is presented in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Payload Composition 
Type 
Code 
ADS-B Message Payload Byte Number 
1-4 5-17 18-29 30-34 











Auxiliary State Vector, AUX SV 
 
There are four basic payloads in ADS-B message: Header, State vector, Mode Status and 
Auxiliary State vector. All UAT message incorporates a Header which provides a means 
to correlate different message received from a given aircraft.  The header includes Payload 
Type Code, Address Qualifier, and Aircraft Address fields. State vector contains position 
information, i.e., latitude, longitude, primary altitude, horizontal and vertical velocity. It 
also contains the air or ground status of the aircraft and the type of primary altitude. Mode 
status elements are aircraft intent data that specify various parameters of the onboard 
avionics including call sign, quality indicators of the position data both in horizontal and 
vertical directions, a quality indicator for velocity data, source integrity level and capability 
modes. Furthermore, the auxiliary payloads include the information about secondary 





Figure 8: Message Fields in Different Payload Elements [8] 
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3.1.2. Message Decode  
 
A python module is developed to decode the data as defined as RTCA DO 282B. The 
module read the archived binary data from a text file. Authenticate messages and then 
decode in consonance with the byte-to-byte definition. Figure 9 shows the algorithm 














The module can process a single file or multiple files in batch depending on the option 
selected by the user. The decoded messages are saved into a .csv file. After that the binary 
Y 
N 
Archived Data Stream 
Save Message Discarding 
Flag-Byte and Control-Escape 
Character 
Authenticate Saved 
Message with Frame 
Check Sequence 
Look for Message with 
Unique Basic/Long 




Decode Data and Save 
Figure 9:Algorithm for Data Decode 
27 
 
data are decoded, the readable message needed to prepare for further analysis. Note that 
decoded basic and long message were saved in between two heartbeat messages. A total of 
four weeks of data is analyzed in this study. ADS-B outputs one text at file every minute, 
1440 files every day and thus four weeks of data brought about 43200 archived text data 
files. Decoded data were saved to a .csv file. Each .csv file contains eight hours of data. 
The decoded message file size is about 4.10 GB. To prepare the data for analysis first task 
was to assign the timestamp in each stream and separate the long and basic messages. Data 
stream received in between two stamps belong to the preceding time stamp. The basic and 
long messages are separated based on the type code. There is a lot more information present 
in the payload elements and not all of them are discussed in this study. Prior assessing the 
messages, a list of message fields for analysis were selected based on FAA’s Performance 
Analysis reports for ADS-B [35] and several flight test reports [36], [25]. The data sorting, 
and filtering were carried out in MATLAB. The data were further sorted by aircraft ID and 
stored in .mat file. Table 5 provides a notion of data filtration and Table 6 listed the message 
fields description considered in this study.  
Table 5: Data Removal Summary 
Entire data rows Removed data rows Saved data rows 
186477411 173624802 12852609 
 
About 6.89% of the entire data is considered in this study, which are the UAT data 
transmitted from ICAO address assigned aircraft. It should be noted that the receiver also 
receives ADS-R and TIS-B. ADS-R is a client-based service that relays ADS-B 
information transmitted by an aircraft broadcasting on one link to aircraft equipped with 
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ADS-B In on the other link. For example, the information for an aircraft equipped with a 
1090ES ADS-B Out system will be re-broadcasted to an aircraft equipped with ADS-B In 
978MHz frequency, and vice versa. The percentage of ADS-R data was higher compared 
to ADS-B, as the all the commercial aircraft use 1090ES ADS-B which in turn transmitted 
via ground stations as ADS-R for UAT transceiver to receive. TIS-B is also a client-based 
service that provides ADS-B Out/In equipped aircraft with surveillance information about 
aircraft that are not ADS-B equipped. Further, the data contain ADS-B messages from 
different ground receiver, surface vehicles etc. Saved data rows belong to only UAT basic 
and long messages transmitted from the aircraft whose address was assigned by ICAO. 
Table 6: Description of the Message Fields 
Address Qualifier Indicate what the 24-bit “ADDRESS” field represents. If the address qualifier 
value is 0, the message is considered from an ICAO target. 
Address Unique ICAO assigned address used to distinguish aircraft 
Latitude, Longitude Two-dimensional position 
Primary Altitude Altitude from barometer in feet 
Secondary Altitude Altitude from GPS sensor in feet 
NICp Navigation Integrity Category for the position, determine whether the 
reported position has an acceptable level of integrity for the intended use. 
NACp Navigation Accuracy Category for Position determine if the reported State 
Vector has sufficient position accuracy for the intended use 
Aircraft State Airborne or on ground condition 
Vertical Velocity Velocity in upward/downward in knots 
Vertical Velocity 
Sign 
Sign indicating the direction of vertical velocity field 
East Velocity Velocity in east/west direction in knots 
East Velocity Sign Sign indicating the direction of east velocity field 
North Velocity Velocity in north/south direction 
North Velocity Sign Sign indicating the direction of north velocity field in knots 
*ADS-B message encodes velocity as knots, distance as NM and altitude as feet, these are standard
units set by FAA and used by ATC for separation.
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3.2 Performance Assessment of the ADS-B System 
3.2.1 Performance parameters 
There are certain parameters that define the performance standard for an ADS-B system. 
i. ADS-B Continuity: It is the probability that the system performs its required function
without unscheduled interruption. ADS-B shall provide surveillance information at a
rate of 1Hz. The continuity of the ADS-B system depends on several factors such as
the continuity of the satellite information, onboard navigation functions and continuity
of datalinks etc.
ii. ADS-B Accuracy: ADS-B accuracy is defined as a measure of the difference between
the aircraft position reported in the ADS-B message field and the true position. It is
also defined as noise where the noise is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution, and
the RMS value is quoted [4]. This accuracy of the position information can be found in
the ADS-B message itself from the quality indicator, Navigation accuracy category-
position (NACp) value. The NACp specifies the accuracy of the aircraft’s horizontal
position information (latitude and longitude) transmitted from the aircraft’s avionics.
The ADS-B equipment derives a NACp value from the position source’s accuracy
output, such as the Horizontal Figure of Merit (HFOM) from the GPS. The NACp
specifies 95% probability that the reported information is correct within an associated
allowance. Table 7 shows the applicable NACp values with Estimated Position
Uncertainty.
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Table 7:  NACp Values Assigned for Different Uncertainty Range. [34] 
NACp Horizontal Position Bound 
0 EPU ≥ 18.52 km (10 NM) 
1 EPU < 18.52 km (10 NM) 
2 EPU < 18.52 km (10 NM) 
3 EPU < 3.704 km (2 NM) 
4 EPU < 1852 m (1 NM) 
5 EPU < 926 m (0.5 NM) 
6 EPU < 555.6 m (0.3 NM) 
7 EPU < 185.2 m (0.1 NM) 
8 EPU < 92.6 m (.05 NM) 
9 EPU < 30 m 
10 EPU < 10 m 
11 EPU < 3 m 
iii. ADS-B Integrity: ADS-B integrity is the level of trust that errors will be correctly
detected. [4]. The NIC parameter specifies a position integrity containment radius. NIC
is reported so that surveillance applications, such as ATC or other aircraft, may
determine whether the reported geometric position has an acceptable level of integrity
for the intended use [37]. When interfacing a GPS position sources, the NIC should be
based on the Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) or Horizontal Integrity Limit (HIL).
However, while HPL values significantly smaller than 0.1 nm can be output from single
frequency GNSS sources, the HPL may not actually achieve the reported level of
protection as there are error contributions that are no longer considered negligible.
Table 8 provides a summary of NIC value for different containment radius.
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Table 8: NIC Value with Associated Containment Radius [34] 
NIC Containment Radius 
0 Unknown 
1 Rc < 37.04 km (20 NM) 
2 Rc < 14.816 km (8 NM) 
3 Rc < 7.408 km (4 NM) 
4 Rc < 3.704 km (2 NM) 
5 Rc < 1852 m (1 NM) 
6 Rc < 555.6 m (0.3 NM) 
7 Rc < 370.4 m (0.2 NM) 
8 Rc < 185.2 m (0.1 NM) 
9 Rc < 75 m 
10 Rc < 25 m 
11 Rc < 7.5 m 
iv. ADS-B Message Field Availability: ADS-B message availability refers to the ability
of the system to transmit all the message fields as defined. This depends on the proper
function of the onboard navigation sources and the proper function of the ADS-B
message generation functions.
Based on the performance parameters along with an extensive study of the overall ADS-B 
system and according to ADS-B performance assessment checklist provided by FAA [35] 
the inspection of the messages involves: 
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i. Message Count Verification: The total number of basic and long messages received
in a second is reported in the consecutive heartbeat message. A number of messages
received in a certain second and number of message parsed was matched to verify if all
the received messages were authentic or not.
ii. Missing Elements Identification: Identify if there is any payload information missing
in the report.
iii. Message Discontinuation: Identify discontinuation when update rate exceeds one
second. This anomaly is called data dropout.
iv. Integrity and Accuracy Check: Check the position data integrity and accuracy for
enhanced surveillance. The minimum NIC and NACp value to operate in the airspace
is seven and eight respectively.
v. Kinematic Check: Includes reasonableness checks of changes in Baro/Geo altitude,
horizontal position, and velocity. This involves a difference in Baro/Geo altitude,
abrupt changes in position from the nominal value, etc.
3.3 Anomaly Detected in ADS-B Messages 
This section introduces the anomalies detected following the inspection checklist provided 
in the previous section followed by a brief description, visual representation and detection 
algorithm of each type of anomalies. A small portion of data (2 days) was used to identify 
any anomalies associated with these inspections. The anomalies revealed in this step by 
step assessment can be divided into five distinct categories namely dropout, missing 
payload, low confident data, data jump and altitude discrepancy.  
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3.3.1 Dropout 
The first and foremost performance metric for any surveillance system is the continuous 
transmission as well reception of the message. Each surveillance sensor has a defined 
update rate or scan rate based on the capability and requirements. ADS-B is designed to 
update every second to provide better traffic scenario, enhance situational awareness and 
address the limitation of ground-based surveillance sensors. Dropout refers to a 
discontinuation of an update within one second. Though it is expected and designed that 
ADS-B will update information at a 1Hz rate, primary inspection reveals that the update 
rate is often much longer than 1 second. Dropouts occurred in flight multiple times, and 
they were of different time durations. Figure 10 is a visual presentation of discontinuation 
of update in a flight. Latitude data is used as a reference of discontinuation of the overall 
message frame.  
Figure 10: Multiple Dropout in A Flight. Latitude Data is Used to Represent the Data 
Gap. In the 70 Minutes’ Flight Span, Data Were Missed Several Times. 

















As in enroute the update interval must not exceed three seconds [37], in this study if the 
time between two consecutive updates is equal to or exceeds the threshold of three seconds 
it is considered as a dropout. The dropout was further classified in a different group. 
Chapter four will provide in detail description of each group of dropouts. A descriptive 
statistic will also be provided. There are cases where the same aircraft flew multiple times 
a day. This made an aircraft appear with a large data gap in between updates. So, in this 
analysis, a threshold of 60 mintues was chosen arbitarily. If the data set interval is more 
than 60 minutes, it is considered as a different flight. Also, there were cases when the 
aircraft was not updating data for more than 10 minutes, those were considered as out of 
range data. Reappearing after 10 minutes, it was considered as different flight.  
3.3.2 Missing payload 
Missing payload refers to two different anomalies. In some cases, the whole basic and long 
messages are missed and in some cases, part of message fields are not present in the 
payload. The first task was to verify the total number of the reports received and parsed. 
According to the algorithm even if the data stream has a basic/long report it will not be 
considered as a valid report if it not of full length or if calculated Frame Check Sequence 
(FCS) doesn’t match with FCS present in the report [34]. This verification discarded the 
messages which were not authentic. On an average, 87% of the received messages were 
full and authentic. Approximately 13% of the reports received that contained important 
navigation information were of no use. Even the successfully parsed messages missed some 
payload information. Most of the time this was Navigation Accuracy value for Position 
(NACp) and Secondary Altitude (essentially Geometric Altitude) value from the long 
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report. NACp specifies the accuracy of the aircraft’s horizontal position information which 
is vital for separation. In most airspaces, NACp must be greater than 8 [38]. The Navigation 
Integrity Category (NIC) values were also missing in some reports, although were not 
considered as severe as NACp. The percentage of payload presence in basic and long report 
are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Percent Message Field Present in The Long and Basic Report Indicating 
Message Loss 
Message Field % Presence in data 
Address Qualifier 100% 
Address 100% 
Latitude, Longitude 100% 
Primary Altitude 100% 
Secondary Altitude 95.00% 
NICp 100% 
NACp 99.50% 
Aircraft State 100% 




East Velocity 100% 
East Velocity Sign 100% 
North Velocity 100% 
North Velocity Sign 100% 
So, 95% of the long message report geometric altitude in the secondary altitude field and 
5% message suffered from losing geometric altitude which is one of the essential elements. 
Also, NACp value wasn't present in 0.50% of the data which is crucial information to 
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determine the accuracy of the position information. Other than these two fields, all the 
other information were available from all aircraft in all data frames.   
3.3.3 Data Jump 
Data jump is a situation where any data point deviates significantly from its previous and 
next sample. This anomaly mostly occurred in latitude and longitude data. This also refers 
to a dispersed data from a regular set of data. It looks like a jump when represented 
graphically.  Thus, a jump is the event when one data point deviates significantly from its 
previous and next sample. As the data jump occurred for latitude and longitude data only, 
the most probable reasons behind are data encoding issue. Either from the GPS end or 
ADS-B message generation end. The FAA also reported on ADS-B position jumps in their 
early implementation experiences and justified the cause as being a position encoding issue 
[4]. Experts from UND aerospace also explained this fact as the transponder issue. Figure 
11 illustrates the jump in latitude data from a nominal value. 
Figure 11: Jump In Latitude Data from Continuous Nominal Value. 












This situation is also known as “ghost traffic” to the air traffic controller, where an aircraft 
is detected in an area but in real there’s no traffic at all.  
3.2.3 Altitude discrepancy 
From the long reports, two different altitudes are available, one from the pressure sensor 
and another from GPS/WAAS. Barometric altitude has long been used by aviation industry 
for measuring altitude and separation. Deviations between barometric and geometric 
altitude were observed from the analysis of the long report. A visual example of deviation 
between altitudes is presented in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Altitude Discrepancy in Climbing Phase of Flight. Blue Rectangles Describe 
Barometric Altitude, and Red Circles Describe Geometric Altitude. 
Although it is not entirely an anomaly from the ADS-B system itself, while using geometric 
altitude from ADS-B message for separation, this deviation might cost safety. Pressure 
altitude is used for separation by convention [23], geometric altitude will be used in the 






















case when barometric altitude is not available. Also, as for sizing and weight capacity, not 
all UAS in NAS will have a pressure sensor installed. So, to address the potential risk 
associated with using multiple sources information for separation an in-depth analysis of 
the altitude deviation was carried out in Chapter five. 
3.3.5 Low confident data 
It is expected that the ADS-B position report will have an NIC value greater than eight and 
an NACp value greater than seven. However, ADS-B system reports position with lower 
than the expected value in some cases. The data is called precision condition data when 
NIC > 8 or NACp > 7. According to NIC, about 3% of the data are non-precision condition 
data, and for 1.82% the integrity was unknown. The highest NIC value observed was ten, 
where the maximum NIC value possible is 11. Figure 13 shows the percent of the data 
integrity in a bar graph.  
Figure 13: Data Integrity Distribution Bar Graph, No Data Were Found Having 
Maximum Integrity. Dashed Line Distinguishes the Precision and Non-Precision Range 














 Precsion DataNon Precsion Data
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No data were found to have the maximum integrity in this dataset. Similar percentage was 
obtained from the accuracy indicator.  The highest value for the accuracy indicator was 10, 
although the maximum possible accuracy indicator value is 11. An NACp value of 10 
implies that the estimated position uncertainty of the GPS position data was less than 10 
meters. That means all the position data reported by ADS-B in the airspace surrounding 
Grand Forks have uncertainty of less than 10 meter. The highest accurate data would reduce 
the uncertainty range from 10 meters to 3 meters.  
3.4 Data Filtering for Extensive Study 
After the anomalies were identified primarily the data sorting algorithm were regenerated. 
The data filtering flow chart is provided in Figure 14. 
Decoded Data for .csv file
Remove data if Address 
Qualifier field ~= 0  
Remove all the data 
column other than 
described in Table 6
Separate data based 
on Aircraft ID 
Save data for all other 
Analysis 
Remove if type 
code~1 (Only long 
message) 
Separate data 






Figure 14: Data Sorting and Filtering Flow Chart Depicts the Steps Use to Filter and 
Sort the Data 
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Data are saved in two different formats, one is for altitude discrepancy analysis, and 
another is for the rest three analysis. This is because not all the aircraft transmit both long 
and basic message; some aircraft just transmit basic, or some transmit the long message 
only while some transmit both alternately. To analyze altitude discrepancy, only long 
messages are of interest as the basic message does not contain secondary altitude 
information. All other assessments need both basic and long messages. So, the message 
fields described in Table 9 from both basic and long messages are saved in cell array based 
file. While each cell contains payloads from certain aircraft.   
For extensive analysis with the altitude discrepancy, the phase of flight is needed to be 
detected. Two different message fields were used to detect the phase of flight. One is 
vertical velocity rate, and another is vertical velocity sign. Table 10 presents the value to 
detect the different phase of flight. The vertical velocity selected is nominal descend and 
ascend rate for general aviation aircraft. 
Table 10: Phase of Flight Detection with Different Threshold Value. 
Vertical Velocity Rate Vertical Velocity 
Sign value 
Phase of flight 
Is greater than 150 knots 1 Ascending 
Is greater than 150 knots 0 Descending 
Is lower than 150 knots ~ Level Flight 
 
The different phase of flight data was further used in different analysis and will be 




ANALYSIS OF DROPOUT & ALTITUDE DISCREPANCY 
 
Among all the anomalies detected dropout and altitude discrepancy were found to be more 
frequent. Considering the versatile features and danger being imposed by them, an in-depth 
analysis was carried out for both dropout and altitude discrepancy. This chapter will expose 
some of the factors that characterize and affect them. Section 4.1 outlines dropout, 
classifies them into different groups and explores some factors that have significant effects 
on dropout. Altitude discrepancy is covered in section 4.2 which investigate the potential 
factors affect and characterize it. Later the discrepancy is also classified in different groups 
to understand the level of severity and features of each category.  
4.1 Dropout 
 
Dropout, an incident where ADS-B message is not continuously updated at 1Hz rate. ADS-
B continuity is the probability that the system performs its required function without 
unscheduled interruption, assuming that the system is available when the procedure is 
initiated [39]. ADS-B continuity includes the continuity of the 
i. functions that affect all aircraft (e.g., satellite and ground data acquisition) 
expressed regarding number of disruptions per year, 




iii. navigation sources (including satellite constellations) of sufficient quality in the 
region which affects many aircraft. 
The continuity of ADS-B system is measured in seconds at which rate the message received 
on the ground receiver. Continuity is one of the crucial metrics for considering the 
performance of the surveillance system. The expected continuity or update rate for different 
surveillance systems according to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [10] 
is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Surveillance Sensor Performance Characteristics 
Surveillance System Range Update Rate 
Primary Surveillance 
Radar 
S-Band: 60-70 NM 
L-Band: 160-220 NM 
4-15 seconds 
Secondary Surveillance 
Radar (Mode A/C) 
200-250 NM 4-15 seconds 
Secondary Surveillance 
Radar (Mode S) 
200-250 NM 4-12 seconds 
ADS-B 200-250 nm 0.5-2 seconds 
 
ADS-B is envisioned to address the limitations of radar systems, with a lower update rate, 
with an update rate of less than 2 s, significantly higher than the radar system’s 4–15 s. The 
preliminary analysis of the test data demonstrates that approximately 67.51% of the 
messages were updated within the specified update rate. Dropout were those 32.49% 
instances where update rate exceeds 3s. 
To understand the factors behind the dropout, a comprehensive review of ADS-B system 
was carried out. The analysis comprises of investigation of data and assessment of the 
systems. The investigation of data includes analyzing the flight information available from 
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the messages. Four essential pieces of information from the flight data are considered as 
potential factors behind drop which referred as airborne factors. These are: 
i. Flight Level (Altitude), 
ii. Distance from the Ground Receiver (Range) 
iii. Heading and 
iv. Position (Latitude, Longitude). 
To reveal the effect of airborne factors statistical hypothesis testing was carried out. Prior 
conducting any statistical test, it is mandatory to know the data distribution. To conduct 
the test, dropout occurrence was categorized based on their duration. Table 12 illustrates 
the update rate category based on the duration of update interval occurred. It represents the 
update rate categorized in eight different group, the frequency of each group dropout 
occurrence along with their percentage. 
Table 12: Update Rate Categorizations 
Category  




Group 0 Within 2 seconds 
4161116 67.51 Not 
Dropout 
Group 1 3 seconds to 5 seconds 1898598 30.80 Dropout 
Group 2 5 seconds to 15 seconds 86876 1.42 Dropout 
Group 3 15 seconds to 30 seconds 6175 0.10 Dropout 
Group 4 30 seconds to 60 seconds 5223 0.08 Dropout 
Group 5 60 seconds 120 seconds 3330 0.05 Dropout 
Group 6 120 seconds to 300 seconds 1365 0.03 Dropout 
Group 7 More than 300 seconds to less than 600 seconds 
451 0.01 Dropout 
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The update interval of Group 0 was within 2 seconds which is the expected update rate for 
ADS-B system and over 67% of the data belong to this group. Group 1 to group 8 are 
remarked as dropout and 32.49% of the data update rate were belong to these eight groups. 
Figure 15 shows the histogram of categorized update rate which clearly indicates update 
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Group 0: Within 2 seconds
Group 1: 3-5 seconds
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Group 3: 15-30 seconds
Group 4: 30-60 seconds
Group 5: 60-120 seconds
Group 6: 120- 300 seconds
Group 7: 300 Seconds-600 seconds















Group 0: Within 2 seconds
Group 1: 3-5 seconds
Group 2: 5-15 seconds
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Group 5: 60-120 seconds
Group 6: 120- 300 seconds
Group 7: 300 Seconds-600
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Most of the dropouts (30.80%) are of group 1, group 2 consists 1.42% of dropouts, group 
3 consists 0.10% of dropouts. The percentage of dropout in rest four groups is 0.17%. Only 
0.01% of dropout duration were in between 300 to 600 seconds. The most prolonged time 
interval with no update was 520 seconds.  
An exponential distribution describes a process which occurs continuously and 
independently at a constant average rate. This kind of distribution was expected as all the 
update rate category are independent of each other, and longer duration of the update is 
minimally wanted. As all the group update changes exponentially, the bar for Group 3 to 
Group 4 are not visible in Figure 15 (a). Thus Figure 15 (b) and Figure 15 (c) is used to 
illustrate the dropout frequency. The dropout frequency is a term used to represent the 
number of event occurred in the dataset. The frequency of Group 0, Group 1 and Group 2 
are higher than the rest of the group. Group 0 update rate was the successful update rate, 
where the remaining groups were marked as dropouts. Figure 15 (b) represents the 
frequency of comparatively shorter duration of dropout with a magnitude of 105. The 
longer duration dropout frequency histogram is shown in Figure 15 (c), and the frequency 
for each group are in a magnitude of 103.  To confirm data distribution Shapiro–Wilk 
normality test was carried out. This test compares the sample data to a normally distributed 
set of data with the same mean and standard deviation. All hypothesis tests ultimately use 
a p-value to weigh the strength of the evidence [40]. A small p-value (typically ≤ 0.05) 
indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, so you reject the null hypothesis. If 
the test is non- significant (p>0.05), the sample distribution is not significantly different 
from a normal distribution. If, however, the test is significant (p<0.05), then the sample 
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distribution is different from a normal distribution. The p value of test data, p test =0.03 < 
.05 proves that the data are not normally distributed and conforms to non-linear function. 
As the data distribution doesn’t follow normality, non-parametric hypothesis testing 
“Friedman Test” was adopted to test significance of the factors in dropout. The Friedman 
test is used to test for differences between two or more groups when the dependent variable 
being measured is ordinal [41], or the continuous data deviates from normality, and the 
independent variable is categorical. It is a non-parametric hypothesis testing. This test was 
chosen because the characteristics of our data agree with the fundamental assumption of 
this hypothesis testing. This test assumes[41] that data are not normally distributed, each 
group is measured on a different occasion for our case different altitude/heading/range, the 
response measured in a continuous level (i.e., dropout in flight time is continuous). Like 
other hypothesis testing if the p-value is lower than 0.05, it implies that there’s significant 
difference between the group in a different category. The test was carried out in Minitab 
which a statistical software [42]. The hypothesis was: 
Ho: There is no significance difference between dropout occurrence and factor levels 
(Flight Level, Range, Heading) 
H1: There is significant difference between dropout occurrence and factor levels (Flight 
Level, Range, Heading) 
The test also provides a rank to each level. In non-parametric statistics, ranks transform the 
numerical values of each group in ascending order which describes the changes in the 
group. An overall chi-square value is also provided which is calculated from sum of 




4.1.1 Effects of Flight Level 
 
To understand the effects of altitude, the categorized dropout were again grouped in 
different flight level. Four different flight levels are chosen, and the number of dropout 
occurred are expressed in per flight hours. FL 1 is a region where the altitude less than 
4000 feet, FL 2 is the region of 4000 feet-8000 feet, altitude region of 8000 feet- 12000 
feet is depicted as FL 3 and the altitude region of 12000 feet-18000 feet is referred to as 
FL 4. For Group 1 to Group 5, the frequency of dropout per flight hours decreases until the 
flight level 3 and it increases again. Group 6 and 7 follows the same trend as the dropout 
frequency decreased until flight level 2 and increased in higher altitude. The frequency of 
each group of dropouts in different flight level is listed in Table 13.  
Table 13: Frequency of Categorized Dropout in Different Flight Level 
Altitude 
 
Frequency of Occurrence Per Flight Hour 






0.132184 0.132184 0.000711 0.000254 0.000112 4.09E-05 1.88E-05 
4000-
8000 feet 








FL 4 0.090449 0.017193 0.003164 0.000897 0.000475 0.000633 5.27E-05 
 
Figure 16 shows grouped drop out frequency changes with different flight level. The Figure 




Figure 16: Grouped Drop Out vs Dropout Per Flight Hour for Four Different Flight Level 
The test result for different flight level dropout frequency indicates there is a significant 
difference in dropout frequency in different flight level. Table 14 represents the statistical 
results; the p-value is 0.03 which reveals the significance of flight level in dropout 
occurrence. 
Table 14: Test Statistics for Different Altitude Level 
Fight Level 
Group 
Rank Test Statistic 
Chi-Square df P value 
FL 1 2.28 23.68 27 .03 
<0.05 FL 2 1.57 
FL 3 2.57 
FL4 3.57 
 
From Table 14 the rank tells the occurrence of dropout in ascending order. FL4 has the 
highest rank which interprets the dropout frequency is higher in that altitude region. FL1 
and FL3 suffered from the dropout mostly after FL4. FL2 suffered least from dropout 



































according to the rank associated. Thus, it reveals that flying in the altitude level 4000 feet 
to 8000 feet will result in less ADS-B message dropout in turn more continuous 
surveillance during flight.  
4.1.2 Effect of Range 
 
A similar statistical testing was carried out to examine the effects of the range of the aircraft 
and the ground receiver. The range was calculated using haversine spherical formula [43]. 
The haversine formula determines the great-circle distance between two points on a sphere 
given their longitudes and latitudes. As in the pass-through interface, data were saved based 
on range, only the aircraft that were within 120 NM of the receiver was found. This range 
is further divided into four categories based the air traffic density. Table 15 listed the 
dropout frequency in a different group in a different range. 
Table 15: Frequency of Categorized Dropout in Different Range 
Range 
Frequency of Occurrence Per Flight Hour 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
Within 20 
NM, A 
0.127236 0.005834 0.00428 0.000353 0.000229 9.55E-05 3.04E-05 
20- 50 
NM, B 
0.12773 0.005881 0.000393 0.00350 0.000211 7.99E-05 2.81E-05 
50-80 
NM, C 
0.12742 0.005796 0.000378 0.000338 0.000224 8.35E-03 3.25E-05 
80- 120 
NM, D 




Figure 17 showed grouped drop out vs drop out frequency per flight hour for four different 
ranges. A small change in frequency in group 3 and group 4 can be seen from the Figure 
however, statistical test is required to reveal the significance of this change.  
 
Figure 17: Grouped Drop Out vs Dropout Per Flight Hour in Different Range 
From ‘Friedman test,' it is found that there is no significant difference between dropout 
frequency and range. It should be noted that the effective range of ADS-B is 200-250 NM. 
All the test data are found within half of the maximum range. This might be a reason why 
the dropout frequency is not significantly different. The test statistics are given in Table 
16. 
Table 16: Friedman Test statistics for Ranges 
Range  
Group 
Rank Test Statistic 
Chi-
Square 
df P value 
Range A 2.85 2.49 27 0.47<0.05 
Range B 2.57 
Range C 2.71 
Range D 1.88 





























The p-value is way much higher than 0.05 depicting no significance of difference range in 
frequency of dropout. 
4.1.3 Effects of Heading 
 
The effect of heading on dropout was also studied using statistical significance test. Figure 
18 provides a visual notion of the heading zone. The heading information is extracted from 
velocity sign field, North Velocity sign implies north-south direction, and East velocity 
sign implies the east-west direction. Table 17 presents the categorized dropout for a 
different zone. It should be noted that traffic density was not equal in the different zones. 
Most of the aircraft were found in Zone B and Zone D. Probably this is because of the 


























Figure 18: Four Different Zones Based on Aircraft Heading 
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Table 17: Listed Frequency of Dropout in Different Zone. 
Zone Frequency of Occurrence Per Flight Hour 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
Zone A 0.126784 0.005384 0.000352 0.000359 0.000272 1.31E-03 2.23E-05 
Zone B 0.126363 0.005104 0.000385 0.000397 0.000189 2.33E-05 3.75E-05 
Zone C 0.126493 0.005121 0.000357 0.000363 0.000268 1.32E-05 2.42E-05 
Zone D 0.12645 0.005342 0.000356 0.000387 0.000231 3.26E-05 2.73E-05 
From a visual perspective from Table 17 and Figure 19, the frequency of dropout 
doesn’t differ in between zones. However, that does not infer that heading does not have 
any impact on dropout frequency. Like previous analysis, the decision made is based on 
the hypothesis testing. 
Figure 19: Grouped Dropout vs Dropout Per Flight Hour in Different Zone 
The test statistics as shown in Table 18 refers a p-value which is higher than 0.05 indicating 
to the fact that heading does not have a significant effect on dropout occurrence. 
































Rank Test Statistic 
Chi-
Square 
df P value 
Zone A 2.71 0.4286 3 0.93>0.05 
Zone B 2.57 
Zone C 2.28 
Zone D 2.42 
 
The p-value of 0.93 (>.05) concluded that heading does not influence the dropout 
occurrence. The value of the ranks for the different zone is not much scattered (i.e., doesn’t 
differ much) rather they differ just after the decimal value which also indicates the dropout 
occurrence is similar in any heading.  
 
4.1.4 Effects of Position 
 
The position (Latitude, Longitude) data where the higher duration of dropout (Group 5- 
Group 7) and the position where they recovered was extracted for this analysis. The aim 
was to examine if a certain position is prone to ADS-B message loss. As position is discrete 
in nature, this was not categorized in groups, rather, it was checked if certain latitude or 
longitude data has more than one dropout. It is found that multiple numbers of dropout 
appeared at certain longitudes. Latitude did not show any characteristics like longitude. 
This refers to the fact that individual longitude lines are susceptible to lose ADS-B signal. 
A histogram of number of dropout at certain longitudes is presented in Figure 20. The 




Figure 20:  Histogram of Dropout at certain longitude 
For a better understanding the longitude along with their latitude where dropout occurred 
most were drawn on a map. Figure 21 shows the map where the red dot indicates the 
position of most dropout occurrence.  
 
Figure 21: Location of the Dropout in Google Map 





















There are certain places which effected most by dropout. Referring to Figure 18 some 
places have a cluster of red dots. To locate those position, a zoomed given the clustered 
red dot is illustrated in Figure 22. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 22: Location of the Clustered Dropout (a) Grand Forks International Airport UND 
Aerospace Runway, Grand Forks, ND (b) Hutson Field Runway, Grafton, ND 
Figure 22 (a) and 22(b) describe the fact that dropout occur mainly at the approach path in 
the terminal area and all of them occurred under the altitude of 1200 feet. It is further 
reveals that this clustered dropout was due to the traffic density at those locations. 
According to FAA in 2015, the enroute traffic density was 17.1% and terminal traffic 
density was 82.9%, based on the statistics of nation’s 34 important airports. [44]. The 
airport regions have higher traffic than any other location, hence the cluster red dots 
appeared. An analysis on range effects already reveals the fact that the frequency of dropout 
per flight hour is similar within range of ground receiver. The map also indicates to a 
similar conclusion as we can see discrete positions also causing higher duration of dropout. 
After analyzing further, it is found that the aircraft either perform a touch and go landing 
or go around in terminal area. A touch and go landing is a common maneuver when 
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learning to fly a fixed-wing aircraft [45]. Figure 20 illustrates the altitude and trajectory 





Figure 23: (a) Altitude Profile during Go Around (b) Simplified Trajectory Pattern, the 
Trajectory only Includes the Go Around Pattern for Better Understanding 





































Touch and go involves landing on a runway and taking off again without coming to a full 
stop. A go-around is a maneuver of aborting landing during final approach [46]. This 
happens when ATC orders to do so, or pilot does not feel safe to land, or there’s an error. 
This maneuver is also initiated by the student pilots for learning purpose [45].  This is 
assumed to occur because of the line of sight communication loss with the ground receiver. 
ADS-B signal is prone to signal loss in lower altitude due to ground infrastructure. This 
might be potential reasons for the occurrence of longer duration of dropout at the time of 
these special maneuvers in the terminal area. 
In the discrete random places other than any airfield, the dropout occurred at an altitude 
higher than 6000 feet. No definite pattern or causes have been found, and these might be 
due to multiple reasons such as path loss, transponder issues, onboard sensor, etc. 
The findings of the dropout analysis are: 
i. Altitude plays a key role in dropout frequency. The lower the altitude, the more 
chances that a dropout will occur in the ground receiver. 
ii. Range does not have any significant role in the frequency of dropout given that the 
data received were within the effective range of the receiver. 
iii. Aircraft heading is not a significant factor for dropout.  
iv. Some position may affect the dropout occurrence if that causes a line of sight 






4.2 Altitude Discrepancy 
 
In aviation, altitude is one of the most crucial pieces of information for navigation and 
vertical separation[47]. Barometric altitude also known as pressure altitude has long been 
used by aviation industry for measuring altitude and separation standard. Pressure altitude 
is the height above a standard datum plane (SDP), which is a theoretical level where the 
weight of the atmosphere is 1,013.2 mb as measured by a barometer [48]. By measuring 
changes in atmospheric pressure from the aircraft static port, onboard barometric altitude 
converts the pressure into altitude in accordance with calibrated reference pressure level. 
The calibration assumes that the pressure drops at a standard rate as altitude is gained [49]. 
It is important to tune the altimeter based on whether the aircraft is above or below 
transition altitude. The concepts of altimeter setting with transition altitude is 
comprehended in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24: Illustration of Altimeter Setting Above and Below Transition Altitude [23] 
 
Transition altitude is the altitude at or below which the vertical position of an aircraft is 
controlled by reference to altitudes. The tuning is known as altimeter setting and 
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categorized in three different setting, i) set on local QNH (Query: Nautical Height), ii) set 
on standard QNE (Query: Nautical Equivalent), and iii) set on QFE (Query: Field 
Elevation). The barometric altitude is referenced to QNE (standard sea level pressure at 
1013.25 hPa at 15°C) whenever the aircraft is above the transition altitude or the local sea 
level pressure provided by the ATC whenever the aircraft is below the transition altitude. 
The altimeter for aircrafts flying below the transition altitude will be set to local QNH; 
which is an altimeter setting based on the local sea level pressure supplied by the ATC. 
Thus, the altimeter will indicate the vertical distance of an aircraft above mean sea level 
(MSL). 
Geometric altitude was brought to modern aviation by Global Satellite Navigation System 
(GNSS). The geometric altitude, derived from GNSS sensor, indicates the vertical distance 
of an aircraft from a reference ellipsoid, WGS-84. WGS-84 is a good approximation to the 
mean sea level around the planet, however, shows some errors concerning the geoid. The 
geoid is defined as the equipotential surface that coincides with mean sea level, and that 
may be imagined extending through the continents where this surface is everywhere 
perpendicular to the force of gravity [27].  
There is no technical reason why geometric altitude cannot be used in ATC applications in 
future [50]. The availability of altitude data from a barometric altimeter, however, is better 
since the altimeter only measures atmospheric pressure and does not require a power source 
or satellites to function [28].  
The discrepancy between the geometric and barometric altitude is categorized in five 
different classes. Table 19 illustrates the range and class for deviation. Deviation starts 
from 25 feet as the altitude encoded in ADS-B UAT messages as 25 feet increment. 
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Discrepancy observed in all phases of flight. Figure 25 referred to the altitude data 
throughout a flight which shows the presence of discrepancy during whole flight time. One 
important observation is that throughout the flight, one of the sources constantly showed 
higher value either geometric altitude or barometric altitude. That depicts either one of the 
sources showed higher value throughout the value throughout the flight. The discrepancy 
was not constant; rather it fluctuated over the duration of the flight. That is the deviation 
offset wasn’t fixed in flight as they were changing. Figure 25 and Figure 26 provides 
a visual illustration of the fact where geometric altitude values change in some instances. 
Figure 25: Altitude discrepancies in all phase of flight. 























Figure 26: Instances of Geometric Altitude Fluctuation. 
Among 1389 aircraft, 1305 aircraft exhibit discrepancy in altitudes. As the discrepancy 
was fluctuating in nature; the classification is based on dataset. The difference between 
geometric and barometric altitude were measured for each dataset. After that, they are 
classified into five distinct categories as described in Table 19. Table 19 also provides the 
percentage of discrepancy in the dataset. 
Table 19: Discrepancy Classification 
Category Discrepancy Range Percentage 
Class 1 25 feet- 100 feet 44.65% 
Class 2 101 feet- 200 feet 38.04% 
Class 3 201 feet -300 feet 14.18% 
Class 4 301 feet-500 feet 2.94% 
Class 5 > 500 feet 0.19% 
Approximately 45% of the data have a discrepancy within 100 feet. Less than 40% of the 
data exhibit discrepancy of 101 feet to 200 feet. Around 3% of the deviation were higher 
















than 300 feet. To understand what causes higher deviation two factors were chosen to 
analyze. One is phase of flight, and another is flight level i.e. altitude. These are selected 
because during climbing and descending the abrupt changes in the environment might 
degrade the barometric altimeter performance and as in higher altitude, the atmospheric 
condition changes barometric altitude tends to give less accurate reading. The next section 
analyzes the characteristics of both altitude data in flight and discusses how they varied. 
 
4.2.1 Phase of Flight 
 
To assess the effect of phase of flight on altitude discrepancy, the overall mean discrepancy, 
mean discrepancy of maximum deviation for each aircraft, mean discrepancy of minimum 
deviation of each aircraft was calculated. Table 20 describes the mean discrepancies. 
Table 20: Mean Discrepancies in Different Phase of Flight 
Phase of Flight Overall Mean 
(feet) 
Mean value of 
minimum discrepancy 
(feet) 
Mean value of 
maximum discrepancy 
(feet) 
Asceding 117.62 27.43 243.70 
Descending 109.78 28.22 225.66 
Level 115.62 31.98 232.27 
  
The same nonparametric hypothesis testing was carried out to discover significant factors. 
The test statistics reveals that there is a significant difference between mean discrepancy 
in a different phase of flight (p<.05). Table 21 presents the test statistics. 
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Table 21: Test Statistics for Mean Discrepancy in Different Phase of Flight 
Phase of 
Flight 
Rank Test Statistic 
Chi-
Square 
df P value 




The overall mean and mean value of maximum discrepancies for ascending phase and level 
flight is higher, which means these two phases suffer from discrepancies more. According 
to the rank, the overall level flight is prone to altitude discrepancies.  Descending phase 
showed lowest mean discrepancies than two other phases, and also it ranked lowest 
indicating the fact that deviation is lower when aircraft is in descend. 
 
4.2.2 Flight Level 
 
The regions of flight levels are similar as described in section 4.1.1. Table 22 shows the 
mean value for a different flight it is clear from the Table that in higher altitude the mean 
discrepancy value increases. That means, at higher altitude, it is most vulnerable to use 
barometric and geometric altitude alternately. Table 22 represents the mean discrepancy 
value in different flight level, and Table 23 shows the test statistics. Flight level categories 




Table 22: Mean Discrepancy Value in Different flight level 
Flight Level Overall Mean 
(feet) 
Mean value of 
minimum discrepancy 
(feet) 
Mean value of 
maximum discrepancy 
(feet) 
FL 1 23.65 18.25 129.88 
FL 2 78.16 58.26 181.21 
FL 3 148.62 122.45 225.97 
FL 4 206.93 141.32 285.36 
 
Table 23: Test Statistics for Mean Discrepancy in Different Flight Level 
Phase of 
Flight 
Rank Test Statistic 
Chi-
Square 
df P value 
FL 1 1 6.0 3 0.01<0.05 
FL 2 2 
FL 3 3 
FL 4 4 
 
The p-value  (0.01<0.05) from hypothesis testing also proves that altitude does have 
significance is altitude deviation. This can be aligned with the previous analysis of phase 
of flight, which showed that ascending and level flight mean discrepancy is higher than 
descending.  
While descending the aircraft FL decreases with time, hence in the lower altitude the 
discrepancy is less. On the other hand, in level flight, the aircraft fly in higher FL, and the 
discrepancy in higher altitude is higher. This can be concluded that deviations mostly 
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happen due to the outside environment; more specifically due to the dependency of 








SEVERITY ANALYSIS IN UAS DAA 
 
Safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System requires that they interoperate 
with existing safety systems for manned aircraft. Federal regulations require manned pilots 
to “see and avoid” other aircraft to remain “well clear” [51]. Since UAS pilots are 
positioned at a ground control station (GCS) without the ability to visually detect potential 
threats from inside the cockpit, they will require a “detect and avoid” (DAA) system that 
provides the information necessary to identify a threat and make an appropriate maneuver 
with the command and control interface. DAA equipment onboard the UA consists of four 
major groups i) a set of surveillance sources, ii) a DAA processor, iii) the aircraft systems, 
and vi) CNPC equipment. The surveillance sources will be of two different class as per 
Minimal Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) [9]. Class 2 builds from Class 1 and 
provides additional capabilities while Class 1 contains the basic DAA equipment.  
i. Class 1: It requires a minimum of three airborne surveillance technologies which 
include ADS B In, active airborne surveillance and an air-to-air radar system. 
ii. Class 2: Class 1 with a compliant TCAS II system integrated with the DAA
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The analysis was done under the assumption that no other UAS DAA system were in use 
except ADS-B In. This is a way of visualizing hazard and severity associated with single 
system error, failure, and malfunction. 
 
5.1 DAA Well Clear  
 
The concept of well clear has been proposed as an airborne separation standard to which 
an unmanned DAA system must adhere to perform self-separation correctly [52]. Well 
clear is the condition of maintaining a safe distance from other aircraft so that it would not 
be the cause of initiate a collision avoidance maneuver by either aircraft. The quantitative 
definition of well clear separation minima is based on acceptable collision risks in 
consideration of its operating environment and compatibility with aircraft collision 
avoidance systems [9]. Horizontal separation minima are based on the time-based 
parameter, and the vertical separation minima are based on distance. Well clear thresholds 
are estimated from the recommendation made by Special Committee -228 [53] and FAA 
stands with the recommendation with a slight modification of vertical separation changing 
vertical separation thresholds from 750 feet to 450 feet [54]. Table 24 represents the well-
clear definition thresholds. 
Table 24: Well Clear Thresholds 
Vertical Separation 














The loss of well clear can be defined as the situation where UAS is near with another 
aircraft such that the following three conditions are concurrently true: 
i. Current Vertical Distance  𝑑𝑑ℎ  ≤ 𝑑𝑑ℎ∗  
ii. Horizontal Miss Distance HMD ≤ HMD* 
iii. Tau Modification, 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗  
Current vertical distance is a spatial threshold in the vertical dimension which depicts the 
relative vertical distance between two aircraft. If h1 and h2 represents altitude of ownship 
and intruder than, current vertical distance is: 
𝑑𝑑ℎ = |ℎ2 − ℎ1| (1) 
The spatial threshold in horizontal dimension is horizontal miss distance (HMD), which is 
defined as the projected separation in the horizontal dimension at the predicted closest point 
of approach (CPA) using constant velocity extrapolation: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = ��(𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 + 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
2 + �𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦 + 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�
2
,𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≥ 0
−∞ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 < 0
(2) 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑥𝑥1, horizontal separation in x-dimension,𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦2 − 𝑦𝑦1, horizontal 
separation in y-dimension, ?̇?𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥 = ?̇?𝑥2 − ?̇?𝑥1, relative horizontal velocity in x-dimension,          
?̇?𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦 = ?̇?𝑦2 − ?̇?𝑦1, relative horizontal velocity in y-dimension, 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = −
𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥+𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦
𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥2 +𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦2
, time to 
closest point of approach (positive when aircraft are converging).  
 
Modified tau, 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the temporal separation metric estimates the time to CPA between 
two aircraft using parameter known as “distance modification” (DMOD) to provide a 
minimum threat range boundary encircling the UAS.  
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,𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 > 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 ?̇?𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 < 0 
 ∞,𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 > 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 ?̇?𝑓𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 ≥ 0
(3) 
 
where DMOD is constant. 
The loss of vertical well clear can be expressed as: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  𝑑𝑑ℎ  ≤ 𝑑𝑑ℎ∗ (4) 
 
moreover, horizontal well clear can be expressed as: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 0 < 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∗  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 < 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻∗                                      (5) 
together the loss of well clear is represented by: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻                                                            (6) 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the concepts of well clear with an encounter between a UAS flying 
level heading east and a manned aircraft flying level heading west from two different 
views. The top view illustrates the concepts of horizontal miss distance and the side view 







Figure 27: Well Clear Illustration (a) Side view, (b) Top view. The dashed objects/lines 
are projection of future path[55]. 
 
5.2 Severity of Dropout in UAS DAA 
 
Although the signal reception performance is different for air to air than air to ground. 
Study founds aircraft at some altitude, the transmission performance of ADS-B air to air 
links is poorer than the air than the ground links. That indicates that UAS or aircraft ADS-
B In receiver might also experiences more dropouts as compared to the ground receiver. A 
head-to-head encounter between manned and UAS was set up to analyze the effect of 
different class dropout as show in Figure 28. The metric used to measure the gravity of 









No particular simulation software was used for this analysis. The scenario is designed to 
experience a head-to-head encounter at the midway of the track. The horizontal velocity 
for the manned aircraft was 200 knots and the UAS was 80 knots, and these are kept 
constant for all dropout values. The DAIDALUS [56] software developed by NASA 
AMES can calculate the well clear parameters if the track, heading and velocity profile is 
known for the ownship and intruder. This study made of the use of that open source 
software to calculate “time to loss of well clear,” the track and heading were generated 
from GPSVisualizer website which can estimate the track given two end points and 
velocity. The well-clear detection logic is implemented to determine the time to loss of 
well clear in a look-ahead time. Look-ahead time is a time interval [53] which is used to 
determine if two aircraft conflict within that time considering constant velocity. The 
predictions made by the detection logic are based on pairwise, constant-velocity 
projections. The logic returns empty if there is no loss of well clear within look-ahead time. 
The time to loss of well clear is used to alert the DAA pilot about potential risk level. Two 
different alert is triggered one is corrective, and another is a warning [57]. The DAA 
corrective alert is intended to get the Pilot In Command’s (PIC) attention, get the PIC to 
determine a needed maneuver, start PIC coordination with ATC, and is the initiating point 
Time to loss of well clear  
Figure 28: Time to Loss of Well Clear in Horizontal Direction 
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at which maneuvering will likely be started based on PIC judgment [9]. The DAA warning 
alert is intended to inform the PIC that immediate action is required to remain well clear. 
Table 25 shows the value of different alerting criteria based on time to loss of well clear. 
Table 25: Alerting Criteria in DAA of UAS 
Time to Loss 




25 Seconds Warning  Immediate Immediate  
55 Seconds Corrective  Immediate  Subsequent  
 
As the detection logic predicts the LoWC within look-ahead time, three different look-
ahead time were used to study the severity of dropout duration. The first look-ahead time 
chosen was 180 seconds, second and the third look-ahead time was 120 seconds and 60 
seconds, respectively. The different time window was chosen to clearly identify the 
severity and hazard associated with each group of dropouts. Table 26 summarize the alert 
triggered in three different look-ahead time. 
According to encounter setup drop out will occur at the beginning of the look-ahead time. 
The different duration of dropout found from the test data was introduced in the setup. For 
simplicity, only one dropout was inserted in the scenario. The number of alerts triggered 
in while dropout is inserted for different group of dropouts was calculated. The alert count 
is based on the “time to loss of well clear.” If the time to loss of well clear is less than or 
equal to alert threshold, the associate alert is assumed to be triggered.  
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Table 26: Alert Triggered in Dropout and No Dropout Case. 
Dropout 
Group 
Look-ahead time, 180 seconds Look-ahead time, 120 seconds Look-ahead Time, 60 seconds 
Loss Warning Corrective Loss Warning Corrective Loss Warning Corrective 
Group 1 No No 60 No No 60 No No 60 
Group 2 No No 60 No No 60 No No 60 
Group 3 No No 60 No No 60 No No 60 
Group 4 No No 60 No No 60 2 48 10 
Group 5 1 34 25 1 54 5 60 No No 
Group 6 60 No No 60 No No 60 No No 




For example, if the “time to loss of well clear” is less than 25 seconds, a warning alert is 
counted. Otherwise a corrective alert is counted. Also, if the “time to loss of well clear” is 
greater than 55 seconds, it is counted as a corrective alert as eventually it will be generated. 
When any dropout duration was higher than the look-ahead those are automatically 
considered as the loss of well clear, as no information is available over the look-ahead time. 
As the dropout increases and the look-ahead time decreases the number of warning alerts 
increases. If there were no dropouts all the alerts triggered would be corrective, as DAA 
would detect the intruder at the appropriate time. The alert triggered for different look-
ahead time is illustrated in Figure 29-31. 
 
Figure 29: Change in Alert Type for Different Dropout with A Look-ahead Time of 180s 































Figure 30: Change in Alert Type for Different Dropout with A Look-ahead Time of 
120s 
 
Figure 31: Change in Alert Type for Different Dropout with A Look-ahead Time of 
60s 
























































It should be noted that some groups contains more sample than other groups, so the number 
of alerts triggered for the group, except group 5, group 6 and group 7 where they were 
either multiplied or normalized by a factor before generating the bar graph. For example, 
for group 4 there were 30 different durations of dropout as the range was 30 seconds to less 
than 60 seconds. As per the algorithm, it triggered five corrective alerts, 24 warning alerts 
and 1 loss of well clear. All the triggered alert number was multiplied by 2 (sample in group 
5/sample in group 4). For cases, where sample number was greater than 60, they  are 
normalized by the factor. This is done so that each group has an equal number of scenarios 
which helps visualize the comparison. As the event of data loss, the DAA logic could not 
predict the encounter in a timely manner. This could lead to an abrupt maneuver of the 
ownship to avoid a potential well clear violation. The part of group 6 and group 7 dropout 
that couldn’t be inserted as those are higher than the look-ahead time. This is a severe case 
where the uncertainty occurred with well clear, and the situational awareness was 
degraded. From the Figures 26-28, it can be seen that the change in alert depends on the 
look-ahead time and when the dropout takes place. When the look-ahead time is less; even 
small duration of dropout can lead to loss of well clear. With a bigger look-ahead time the 
alert was corrective until the group 4 dropout. The case where dropout was greater than the 
look-ahead time considered an obvious violation of well clear.  
 
5.3 Severity of Altitude Discrepancy in UAS DAA 
 
To understand and estimate the effect of altitude discrepancy, a series of geometric 
encounters were developed. Three different scenarios were selected with UAS as ownship 
and manned aircraft as an intruder. The aim of this experiment was to visualize the severity 
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associated with using two different altitude sources for self-separation. For each intruder, 
three different deviation values (maximum, minimum and average) were added with 
primary separation. Theoretically this means changing the altitude source at that instant. 
The primary vertical separation was 600 feet assumed to measure with same altitude 
source, i.e., barometric altimeter. The vertical well clear separation minima is 450 feet, the 
value of 600 feet was arbitrarily chosen to keep them well separated at the beginning. At 
the beginning of all the encounters both aircraft were in a both vertically and horizontally 
well clear situation. The number of encounters that lost vertical well clear after introducing 
discrepancy was counted. Adding discrepancy depicts that separation was maintained with 
different altitude sources in this stage. The scenarios are: 
i. UAS level flight and Manned Aircraft ascending 
ii. UAS level flight and Manned Aircraft descending 
iii. UAS and Manned Aircraft are on level flight and vertically separated  
As the encounters were kept horizontally well clear though out each case, only vertical 
parameters were needed to simulate the study. The parameters for the well clear volume 
penetration analysis are described in Table 27. 

















5.3.1 UAS level flight and manned aircraft ascending 
 
The first scenario analyzed assumes ownship UAS is in level flight and intruder manned 
aircraft is ascending. At any given instant, ownship is in both horizontal and vertical well 
clear with the intruder. At this point the vertical separation was maintained with the same 
altitude sources. Figure 32 (a) illustrates this stage. After that the deviation is added with 
manned aircraft altitude which means separation is now maintained with two different 
altitude sources. It should be noted, both cases occurring at the same instant. The aim is to 
visualize what it would looks like if there are two same altitude sources and different 












dh= 600 feet 
dh < 600 feet 
Figure 32: (a)Vertical Separation Using Intruder’s Barometric Altitude Sources at 
Time, t (b) Vertical Separation Using Intruder’s Geometric Altitude Sources At The 




A total of 1400 manned aircrafts’ ascending data were used in this study. The bar diagram 
in Figure 33 represents the results. The bar represents the number of geometry that remain 
well clear. The blue bar shows the initial well clear state; red bar delineates the number of 
geometries that remain well clear after adding deviation. As mentioned earlier, the 
minimum, maximum and average deviation in all phase of flight for each aircraft were 
measured. Those values were introduced this penetration analysis. The minimum deviation 
ranges from 0 to 125 feet; maximum deviation ranges from 275 to 625 feet and the average 
deviation is ranges from 115 to 255 feet. Referring to chapter four where the discrepancy 
was classified in different ranges. According to Table 19, the minimum discrepancy 
belongs to class 1 and class 2, the average discrepancy represents part of class 2 and class 
3. The maximum discrepancies are the member of the part of class 3, class 4 and class 5.  
 
Figure 33: Well Clear Remaining for scenario 1. 
Figure 33 describes that, with minimum deviation, the number of geometries lost well clear 




























almost half of the cases loss well clear. That means class 3, class 4 and class 5 deviation 
will result in a situation where confidence level of the well clear state will be lower 
indicating the fact that using alternate source during flight in a congested airspace might 
lead to well clear violation. 
 
5.3.2 UAS level flight and manned aircraft descending 
 
The second scenario involves UAS with manned aircraft in descending phase. A total of 
1389 aircrafts’ descending phase data were utilized in this scenario. Figure 34 is visual 









dh= 600 feet 
dh<600 feet 
Figure 34: (a) Vertical Separation Using Intruder’s Barometric Altitude Sources 
at Time, t, (b) Vertical Separation Using Intruder’s Geometric Altitude Sources 
at The Same Time, t 
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Scenario 2 produces the similar results as scenario 1. Almost 40% of the geometries lost 
well clear when maximum deviation in flight were introduced, as seen in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: Well Clear Remaining for scenario 2. 
It is observed that, the number of loss of well clear encounters is lower when manned 
aircraft is flying above the UAS. This is because it depends on which altitude value is 
higher. If the geometric altitude value is higher and manned fly above the UAS, the 
separation will increase. On the other hand, if the barometric altitude is higher in that case 
for scenario 2, separation will decrease, hence the number of loss of well clear will increase. 
 
5.3.3 UAS and manned aircraft is on level flight and vertically separated 
 
To understand the effect of the higher value, i.e. whether geometric altitude is higher than 
barometric altitude or the other way, another scenario was set up. In this case, both the 


























small change in value will violate well clear. As there is no vertical velocity, the loss of 
well clear it entirely depends on the deviation between barometric and geometric altitudes. 
This scenario has two different case one if UAS is above the manned aircraft and another 
is UAS is below the manned aircraft. Chapter four discussed the fact that, it is not constant 
which altitude will be of higher value. It changes from flight of flight. This fact effects the 
well clear penetration. To visualize this two-different case is created with similar 












The bar diagram clearly indicates the difference in penetration. Figure 37 (a) shows the 
penetration results for case 1 and 37 (b) shows the penetration results form case 2.  As 
revealed in chapter four in most cases barometric altitude is higher than geometric 
dh= 460 feet 
dh= 460 feet 
Figure 36: (a) UAS and Manned intruder are on level flight vertically separated 
by 460 feet, UAS flying in lower Flight level, (b) UAS and Manned intruder are 
on level flight vertically separated by 460 feet, UAS flying in Upper Flight level 
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This is because the geometric altitude will lower the flight level of manned intruder hence 
the violation will occur. On the other hand, if the UAS fly in upper flight level than the 
manned intruder it will increase the vertical separation. In most of the test data, barometric 
altitude was higher as a result while UAS was flying at upper flight level, the number of 
remaining well clear geometry is higher than UAS flying at lower flight level than the 
manned intruder. 
 
5.4 Hazard Analysis 
 
Hazard analyses are performed to identify and define hazardous conditions/risks for the 
purpose of their elimination or control. One of the crucial step is to perform a risk 
assessment of the severity of consequence and likelihood of occurrence. To assess risk, the 
FAA and other organizations use Safety Risk Management (SRM), which is a process to 
analyze, assess, and accept risk for designs, policies, and many other aspects. Identification 
of a risk is the first step in the risk control process. According to [58] evaluation of risks 
requires determination of how frequently a risk occurs and how severe it could be if and 
an accident occurs as a result of the hazards. A severe risk that has a realistic possibility of 
occurring requires action; one that has an extremely remote chance may not require action. 
Similarly, a non-critical accident that has a realistic chance of occurring may not require 
further study. The frequency may be characterized qualitatively by terms such as "frequent" 
or "rarely." It may also be measured quantitatively such as by a probability. Hazard 
analyses can be performed in either a qualitative or quantitative manner or a combination 
of both. A qualitative analysis is a review of all factors affecting the safety of a product, 
system, operation, or person. It involves examination of the design against a predetermined 
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set of acceptability parameters. In a quantitative analysis, the risk probability is expressed 
using a number or rate. Probability is the expectation that an event will occur a certain 
number of times in a specific number of trials. Actuarial methods employed by insurance 
companies are a familiar example of the use of probabilities for predicting future 
occurrences based on past experiences. Reliability engineering uses similar techniques to 
predict the likelihood (probability) that a system will operate successfully for a specified 
mission time. Reliability is the probability of success. It is calculated from the probability 
of failure, in turn calculated from failure rates (failures/unit of time) of hardware (electronic 
or mechanical).  
A risk matrix is one of the tools that helps quantify the amount of risk. The risk matrix 
considers the severity and likelihood of an event, then using the combination of both 
interactions, assigns a rating in terms of risk: unacceptable risk, acceptable risk with 
mitigation, and acceptable risk. The FAA severity definitions, the FAA likelihood 
definitions and the generic FAA risk matrix are provided in Table 28, Table 29 and Table 
30, respectively. 
Table 28: Likelihood definition by FAA 
Frequent, A Expected to occur routinely 
Probable, B Expected to occur often 
Remote, C Expected to occur infrequently 
Extremely Remote, D Expected to occur rarely 







Table 29:  Severity Definition as per FAA 























(one or two); or a 




fatality to all on 
board) usually 
with 




Table 30: FAA Generic Risk Matrix 
 
5.4.1 Hazard analysis for dropout 
 
A risk matrix for dropout was created based on the percent of dropout occurred in dataset 
and the value of time to loss of well clear. The severity matrix was developed based on 
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“time to loss of well clear”, tloss value. A value of tloss = 55 seconds will trigger a corrective 
alert where as a value of tloss=26 seconds will also trigger a corrective alert, but the risk 
associated in both alerts isn’t the same. As the time window to initiate a maneuver is less 
for the second one, there will be increased risk.  The risk matrix developed is based on one 
head-to-head encounter scenario, hence the risk rating doesn’t represent the overall risk of 
the airspace. The likelihood and the severity definition developed for the dropout hazard 
assessment is described in Table 31 and Table 32. 
Table 31: Likelihood Definition for Dropout 
Frequent, A Occurred in more than 10% times in dataset 
Probable, B Occurred in less than 10% but more than 1 % times 
Remote, C Occurred in less than 1 % but more than 0.10 times 
Extremely Remote, D Occurred in less than 0.10% cases but more than 0.01% 
times 
Extremely Improbable, E Occurred in less than 0.01% times 
 
Table 32: Severity Definition for Dropout 
Minimal,1 Minor,2 Major,3 Hazardous,4 Catastrophic,5 
tloss is greater 
than 55 
seconds 
tloss is in 
between 40 -55 
seconds 
tloss is in 
between 25-40 
seconds 
tloss is in 
between 10-25 
seconds 
tloss is less than 
10 seconds 
 
Based on the definition, the number of alert triggered for two different look-ahead time are 
placed on the risk matrix. To establish, the number of alert triggered from tloss less than 55 
seconds were counted and which group of dropouts caused this trigger was estimated. The 
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occurrence frequency of that group of dropouts determines the likelihood of this alert.  The 
risk rating matrix is shown in Table 33- Table 35. 
Table 33: Risk rating with look-ahead time 180 Seconds 













Frequent, A 298 -- -- -- -- 
Probable, B -- 12 -- -- -- 
Remote, C -- -- 8 -- -- 
Extremely Remote, D -- -- -- 42 -- 
Extremely 
Improbable, E 
-- -- -- -- -- 60 
 
 
Table 34: Risk rating with look-ahead time 120 seconds 













Frequent, A 245 -- -- -- -- 
Probable, B -- 15 -- -- -- 
Remote, C -- -- 16 24 -- 
Extremely Remote, D -- -- -- -- 60 
Extremely 
Improbable, E 





Table 35: Risk rating with look-ahead time 60 seconds 













Frequent, A 137 -- -- -- -- 
Probable, B -- 54  -- -- 
Remote, C -- -- 66 48 -- 
Extremely Remote, D -- -- -- -- 90 
Extremely Improbable, 
E 
-- -- -- -- --  65 
 
As seen from Tables 33-35, when the look-ahead time decreases the alert number severity 
increases. A small look-ahead time window made DAA alert more severe, which indicates 
to the fact that the time at what dropout occur in crucial for alert. Thus, indicates that the 
time when a dropout occurred is crucial for DAA. This provides the pictures of DAA 
alerting using ADS-B as a single means of surveillance. It should be noted DAA computer 
discards an aircraft as a potential threat if the data isn’t updated for certain time period, and 
this time defined by user. This pointed to the facts that in the event of dropout, a potential 
threat might be excluded and will not be considered as a threat anymore. This might lead 
to abrupt maneuvers when reappeared and in the worst-case a near midair collision.   
 
5.4.2 Hazard analysis of altitude discrepancy 
 
The risk matrix of altitude discrepancy is based on the number of loss of well clear each 
time when discrepancy was added. The vertical penetration into the well clear volume was 
calculated and depending on the depth of the penetration the severity was measured. The 
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metric used to measure how acute the well clear violation, is severity of loss of well clear 
(SLoWC). It calculates the penetration into the well-clear zone, ranges from 0% to 100%. 
A SLoWC of 0% means well clear and 100% means zero horizontal and vertical separation.  
The vertical penetration is expressed as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �
𝑑𝑑ℎ
450
, 1� (7) 
where dh is the relative vertical distance at that instant. NMAC could occurred when the 
vertical penetration is greater than 55%.  The likelihood definition developed for the 
altitude discrepancy hazard is described in Table 36. 
Table 36: Likelihood Definition for Altitude Discrepancy 
Frequent, A Occurred in more than 45% cases 
Probable, B Occurred in less than 45% but more than 15 % cases 
Remote, C Occurred in less than 15 % but more than 1% cases 
Extremely Remote, D Occurred in less than 1% cases but more than 0.5% cases 
Extremely Improbable, E Occurred in less than 0.5% cases 
 
Definition for the severity for altitude discrepancy is developed in Table 37, where the 
level of severity is defined based on the penetration percentage. The higher the penetration, 
the more severe the hazard. 
Table 37: Severity Definition for Altitude Discrepancy 















Out of 13776 geometry penetration, 5029 cases lost vertical well clear. The risk rating for 
different scenario is presented in Table 38 – 40 showing the risk rating for different 
measure of deviation. 
Table 38: Risk rating for Minimum discrepancy 













Frequent, A 1298 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Probable, B -- -- -- -- -- 
Remote, C -- -- -- -- -- 
Extremely 
Remote, D 
-- -- -- -- -- 
Extremely 
Improbable, E 
-- -- -- -- ---- 
 
Table 39:Risk rating for Average discrepancy 
       Severity 
 
Likelihood 
Minimal Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 
Frequent, A 1069 -- -- -- -- 
Probable, B -- 426 -- -- -- 
Remote, C -- -- -- -- -- 
Extremely 
Remote, D 
-- -- -- -- -- 
Extremely 
Improbable, E 
-- -- -- -- ---- 
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Table 40: Risk rating for Maximum discrepancy 
       Severity 
 
Likelihood 
Minimal Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 
Frequent, A -- -- -- -- -- 
Probable, B -- 1018 -- -- -- 
Remote, C -- -- 860 -- -- 
Extremely 
Remote, D 
-- -- -- 321 37 
Extremely 
Improbable, E 
-- -- -- -- ---- 
 
Table 40 displays the risk level of the penetration where 37 cases would turn to catastrophic 
failure if two different sources were used as the separation standard. Although the biggest 
percent of loss of well clear severity were minimal, a more complex geometry might 
change the severity level. Around 40% of the encounter severity (yellow blocks) belongs 
to the acceptable risk with mitigation. That means tracking and monitoring is required in 
those case such that they do not bring out more severity in congested airspace. Based on 
the penetration analysis and the severity of penetration, risk rating is also assigned to the 
classes of discrepancy.  
Class 1 discrepancy occurred frequently and from the penetration analysis it is revealed 
that even it led to loss of well clear in some cases, the penetration is small (within 5% of 
the volume) and this poses the minimal amount of severity. Most of the class 2 and class 3 
discrepancy causes a penetration of less than 20% and less than 40%, respectively. These 
belongs to the risk acceptable with mitigation category. Class 4 and Class 5 poses most 
threat to vertical separation and aerospace safety. Both classes could lead to a near midair 
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collision. Though the likelihood of class 5 discrepancy is extremely improbable by our 








This chapter links probable causes of the dropout and altitude discrepancy through a system 
level assessment. A system level assessment starts from the main event and go down to all 
probable causes that lead to that event in that system. For altitude discrepancy, a model to 
compare two measurement systems is introduced, to understand their agreement and 
conditions. The brief description is provided in what perspective ATC is being affected 
with these anomalies and how these have adverse effect in congested airspace.  
 
6.1 System Level Assessment for Dropout 
 
For dropout system-level assessment comprises of two different end systems; transmitter 
end and receiver end. Based on this, the loss of message from ADS-B at any instant are 
due to following factors: 
i. ADS-B out system failed to send message, 
ii. Ground Receiver failed to receive and/or decode the message 
6.1.1 ADS-B out system fails to send message 
 
ADS-B is dependent onboard GPS system. Temporary unavailability of the GPS system 
may result in an error in message generation. After gathering the information from GPS 
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and flight computer, ADS-B generates the message. Fault in ADS-B message assembly 
can be caused by data processing error, data encoding errors and bugs in the module [30]. 
Another potential reason of unavailability is the failure of the antenna to transmit the signal.  
6.1.2 Ground receiver fails to receive/decode the message 
 
The reasons behind Ground Receiver not to be able to receive the message are related to 
UAT signal loss event due to multipath, interference and path loss.  
• Multipath Effect: A theoretical signal analysis used collected on-air data to examine 
the error induced by multipath showed that maximum error level is about twice that 
of Mode S ES collected at the same bandwidth [59].  
• Interference: Interference can be from radio frequency or from electromagnetic 
field. During heavy traffic interference from other aircraft signal might cause ADS-
B signal loss. Also closely located Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) antenna 
can degrade the ground receiver performance [60]. Heavy electronic machines 
installed near airport are the potential reason of electromagnetic interference which 
also affect reception of ADS-B signal [61]. 
• Path Loss: The power of transmitted signal decreases as the distance between 
transmitter and receiver increases. ADS-B signal is affected by path loss and the 
probability of message reception decreases with the distance [62]. 
• CRC Check: A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is an error-detecting code 
commonly used to detect accidental changes to raw data. ADS-B uses cyclic 
redundancy check to validate the correctness of received message [34]. Messages 




In dropout encounters, one of the most common solutions is to use path prediction 
algorithms. But the problem with the path prediction algorithms is that, it predicts path 
until a certain time threshold, if any update is not received within that threshold, the 
algorithm discards that aircraft from a potential threat list. As the dropout duration is 
varying, the path prediction might not work for some of the dropout cases. Another means 
is multi sensor fusion, as described this analysis is based on considering ADS-B as a single 
means of surveillance, the input from other DAA surveillance wasn’t taking into account. 
To reduce the severity, it is important to have sensor fusion with ADS-B, so that in the 
event of ADS-B unavailability other DAA can detect the potential threats. 
  
6.2 System Level Assessment for Altitude Discrepancy  
 
To analyze system level error for discrepancy, it is assumed that neither barometric nor 
geometric altitude is true, rather the both have some error. This can be analyzed from two 
different ends, one from sensor end and another from the ADS-B system end.  
6.2.1 Error induced in sensor end 
 
For barometric altimeter 
• Error in pitot static tube: Pitot static tube measures the outside air flow velocity 
which is used to calculate the barometric altitude. Any malfunction in pitot tube 
will be lead to erroneous altitude value. 




6.2.2 Error induced in ADS-B system 
 
• Message generation error: As the altitude was encoded in a 25-foot resolution, 
rounding error introduces discrepancy. 
Whatever the potential reason is, as described in chapter four, the discrepancy is degrading 
the safety. It is known to both pilot and ATC that the two altitudes are not same [37]. Still 
they are by law can be used as an alternate. While in manned aircraft pilot has the provision 
of “eye” and also communication advantages with ATC, UAS lacks these benefits. So, 
altering the source of separation might not be that safe for UAS as in manned aircraft. Thus, 
it is essential to understand the agreement between two altitudes to what extent is it safe 
interchanging barometric and geometric regardless flight conditions. Choosing the right 
tool while describing their relationship with each other is crucial. Two most widely-used 
concepts to determine the association between variables are agreement analysis and 
correlation. Though both methods seem alike they represent completely different 
perceptions of relationship. Assessing agreement between variables assumes that the 
variables measure the same construct, while the correlation of variables can be evaluated 
for variables that measure entirely different constructs [63]. Assessing agreement focuses 
on how much two measurement system agrees with each other, it is a simplified approach 
in biostatistics and medical device research. Whenever a new measurement system is 
introduced; the concordance in the results between new one and an established one is 
analyzed to understand if they are interchangeable. Moreover, to decide whether two 
measurement systems agree sufficiently to be used interchangeably, one must compare the 
agreement with an acceptable difference. In other word, they can be used interchangeably 
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if the difference between single measurements from two systems falls within the range that 
is deemed to be acceptable [64].  
Among a number of statistical methods for assessing agreement such as comparing mean 
and variance [65], regression [66],  limit of agreement [67]; a  regression approach is 
adapted as it is most compatible with test data. The basis of the regression technique lies 
in the comparison of the fitted regression line to the line of equality. The idea is that the 
further the fitted line, the more evidence that the measurement agreement is lower. The 
common convention to describe a linear mixed effects structural model for regression is, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖2 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 (8) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖2 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 are the random variable measured by system two and one respectively, 
(𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽) are the parameters that quantify absolute biases and 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 is the measurement error. 𝛼𝛼 
is the fixed bias since it increases or decreases the average measurement of the second 
system by a fixed amount and 𝛽𝛽 the proportional bias as it influences the second system’s 
measurements by an amount that is proportional to the true value [64]. However, because 
of measurement system are not free from error and thus the true values of the measured are 
unknown it is not possible to estimate the absolute value of 𝛼𝛼 and β, rather the relative 
biases 𝛼𝛼� and ?̂?𝛽 are estimated.  
6.2.3 Model checking for intended analysis 
 
Several regression approaches are available to estimate model parameters and the 
difference lies in the estimation procedure and its underlying assumptions. Simplest 
method to carry out a regression analysis is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The 
assumptions for OLS are: 
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i. The measurements made by reference measurement systems are error free, and 
ii. The error in the measurements made by the second system have a constant error. 
But these assumptions don’t hold true for the test data. As barometric altitude is used for 
separation by convention, this is considered as the reference system variable and second 
system variable is the geometric altitude. Although barometric altitude is by convention 
used by pilots and ATC, it is not free from errors. The calculation of barometric altitude 
depends on weather components and error can induced from sensor. Also, the altimeter 
setting during flight is prone to human errors. As the reference measurement system is not 
error free, ordinary least squares cannot be used for this comparative study. 
The second approach is ordinary deming regression which assumes measurement error for 
both systems and considers error made by second measurement system is constant. So, 
unless the errors are known this assumption is unreasonable. A more complex yet widely 
applicable approach is weighted deming regression. The advantages of this method are; it 
allows for measurement error to exist in both measurement systems, and introduce non-
constant variability. It minimizes the sum of the weighted squared deviations from the 
fitted line, and the angle at which the deviations are minimized is determined by the ratio 
of two variances. Considering the facts that none of our measurement systems are error-
free and error is not constant weighted deming regression is adopted. 
Let, barometric altitude and geometric altitude are represented as 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 and 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔  respectively. 
If  𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏and 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔 are the respective measurement error than  
𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 = 𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏 (9) 
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔 = 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 + 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔 (10) 
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where 𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏 and 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 depicts the true value. With the fixed and proportional bias (α, β) the 
second measurement system regression equation becomes: 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏 (11)  
 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 and 𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏 are the estimates of true value. 
The slope estimate, 𝛽𝛽 is computed as 
𝛽𝛽 =
(𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞𝑤𝑤 − 𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤) + �(𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤 − 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞𝑤𝑤)2 + 4𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤2
2𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤
(12) 
and, the intercept α, is estimated as: 
𝛼𝛼 = 𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤 − 𝑏𝑏1𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 (13) 
A detailed parameter estimation can be found in Appendix B. Ascending or descending 
phase of each flight considers as one subject, this is because the slops for these two phases 
are clearly distinct so assuming one entire flight as one subject would induce error while 
estimating parameters. The altitude data found in taxiing and level flight are taken as a 
replicated measurement as they were no vertical displacement. So, the error variance is 
calculated using these replicated measurements. Taking replicate in two different phases 
introduce error that resulted from different flight condition.  
6.2.4 Analysis of model parameters 
 
As discussed, the values of model parameters not only decide how well they agree with 
each other but also describes the relation between two values in flight. Both the sign and 
value of (𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽) are important to understand the characteristics of the deviation. If the 
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estimated value of proportional bias is greater than one and the estimated value of fixed 
bias, β has negative sign depicts that the barometric altitude is higher than the geometric 
one. If the sign is positive indicates geometric altitude is higher than barometric. The study 
reveals that the model parameters are not same for different flights. As the weather 
conditions were different for each day and the modeling parameters varies significantly. 
The absolute fixed bias ranges from 3 feet to 374 feet. Where fixed bias differs remarkably, 
the changes in proportional bias is not that notable. As the proportional bias is the multiply 
factors, a consistence value of α indicates the system consistency. And the changes in β 
value concludes the fact that, the deviation induced mostly due to the weather effect. This 
leads to a conclusion that, it is hard to come up with a system comparison model of altitude 
deviation. Because each flight faces unique environmental condition. This leads to the need 
for direct modelling of altitude conversion considering weather factors. Barometric altitude 
mostly depends on the weather conditions such as temperature and pressure, and geometric 
altitude is affected by clouds and atmospheric layers. Though there is no established 
conversion model of two altitudes yet, some provision should be made while using an 
alternate source for separation in congested airspace. An analysis is further carried out as 
to see if any offset value exclusively calculated at first few minutes of flying could make 
the scenario better. Using the deming regression, the (α, β) value was calculated for each 
flight using first 5 minutes of data (includes more than 250 data points on average for each 
aircraft). Referred to section 5.3 in the well clear penetration analysis, the associated offset 
value calculated for that flight was inserted further. The sign of β determines whether to 
add the offset or to subtract. This was done to see if adding an exclusively calculated offset 
value and introducing them while using secondary altitude for separation could reduce the 
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loss of well clear., though not fully but about 95% cases regain well clear using offset value 
if the deviation was minimum and average, the percent of well clear regain is slight less 
(90%) for the cases where deviation were maximum. The green bar shows the number of 
cases where well clear is regained. The offset inserted in level flight was the offset that are 
calculated in the ascending phase of that flight. Figure 35-37 depicts the results.  
 
Figure 38: Well clear Regain using "offset value" in ascending flight scenario 
 
 

























































Figure 40: Well clear Regain using "offset value" for level flight 
Though a conversion model that consider weather effect and satellite geometry would be a 





































































that a conversion offset will enhance the safety and will reduce the vertical loss of well 















The aim of this study was to understand the current state of ADS-B system surveillance 
and understand its vulnerabilities in the future congested airspace. To fully utilize the 
airspace and to accommodate increasing traffic it is important to address the issues and 
factors regarding ATC surveillance. This work starts with chapter II stating the past and 
present of surveillance system, and the need for the newly designed ATC surveillance 
concept named NextGen. Chapter II also introduces the backbone of the NextGen ATC, 
ADS-B system. The technical aspects start in chapter III which contain ADS-B message 
definition, message extraction and performance parameters. Five different anomalies were 
identified, namely dropout, low confident data, message loss, data jump and altitude 
discrepancy. This chapter also describes how the entire volume of data was sorted for 
analysis and how the inspection process to detect anomalies.  
An in-depth study was carried out for two main types of anomalies:  dropout and altitude 
discrepancy in chapter IV. These are chosen because of their frequent presence in the test 
data and their nature of occurrence. The dropout duration was further classified in different 
groups and statistical tests were carried out for some flight conditions and factors. It was 
found that altitude plays a vital role in dropout occurrence frequency. Higher altitude levels 
showed longer duration of dropout. In some positions ADS-B signal were more frequently 
lost due to higher traffic density. This happens when the altitude is lower than 1000 feet.
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This was the situation when the aircraft was on the approach path to runway, and as there 
was more ground infrastructure it was considered as a line of sight communication loss. 
For altitude discrepancy, both phase of flight and altitude have significant effects on 
deviation. The deviation was more when the aircraft was on level flight and lowest when 
the aircraft was on the descending phase of flight. Also as the altitude increases the 
deviation increases. This can be co-related with the phase of flight. When an aircraft is 
flying at cruise altitude, it is flying at the highest altitude of its entire flight profile. And 
while descending, the altitude is decreasing and thus in descending and lower altitude the 
deviation is less. At higher altitudes the temperature profile is not the same as the lower 
altitude. As barometric altitude is entirely dependent on the outside conditions, thus 
varying temperature profiles, from low to high altitude induce varying deviation. The 
severity of this varying amount of deviation is further highlighted in chapter V. 
Once all the analysis was done, the results were further utilized to assess the severity of the 
anomalies. As introducing UAS in NAS is a concern for future ATC operation some 
hypothetical encounter scenarios were introduced to quantify the risk of dropout and 
altitude discrepancy. For dropout, the scenario was based the horizontal well clear violation 
and for altitude discrepancy the scenarios were vertical well clear violations. The DAA 
well clear logic was recommended by RTCA SC-228, approved by FAA and developed by 
NASA. Risk matrix established is based on the simulation scenarios and doesn’t represent 
the overall risk of the airspace. Time to loss of well clear metric was used to measure the 
severity of different durations of dropout. The results revealed that with a lower look-ahead 
window, the severity of dropout increased. The longer the duration of dropout posed more 
severity than the shorted duration dropout. Risk from altitude discrepancy was assessed 
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using vertical penetration to the well clear volume, the more it penetrated the more likely 
it was to occur a near midair collision. It was found that, the class 1 and class 2 discrepancy 
have minimal effect while class 4 and class 5 pose catastrophic severity.  
Finally, chapter VI ties the anomalies to the system where they could have induced. It starts 
with the top event and goes all the way down each systems and sub systems which 
individually or collectively lead to the anomaly. A system comparison model was described 
for the geometric and barometric altitudes to find agreement between them. The offset 
values found using deming regression were different for different flight for same aircraft. 
This lead to the conclusion to the fact that, it wouldn’t be beneficial to generalize a model 
for all flight conditions, because every flight experience separate and unique environment. 
But it is also important to measure the difference of altitude with some sort of offset or 
conversion model while flying in reduced vertical minima. If any offset can be calculated 
for each flight exclusively and could be used while alternating the source that would keep 
the aircraft well clear from each other.  
Analyzing all the anomalies leads to the conclusion that these failures can affect ATC 
operation from two different perspectives as follows: 
i. From Airspace Perspective 
o Dropout  
o Low confident data 
ii. From Aircraft Perspective 
o Data jump 
o Partial message loss 
o Altitude discrepancy 
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Dropout and low confident data can affect the airspace because some dropout seems to 
appear more in some distinct position where it is assumed they lost the line of sight 
communication. Also, if in certain area the satellite geometry is poor the ADS-B will lack 
integrity and accuracy. In both cases, air to ground surveillance will be degraded for that 
certain airspace. In this case, all the aircraft entering that area will suffer in low situational 
awareness and possibly experience loss of data. data jump, partial message loss. Altitude 
discrepancy will affect the particular aircraft mostly, but will generally not degrade the 
scenario of the whole airspace. In future, where it is expected that the airspace will be 
utilized fully, in the presence of congested traffic, aircraft in the vicinity of the victim 
aircraft would suffer from degrading situational awareness. So, although some anomalies 
affect only one aircraft that doesn’t mean other aircraft in that airspace are safe. The safety 
of the airspace wouldn’t degrade significantly as a whole but would decrease the safety 
and reliability.  
Both class 1 and class 2 UAS DAA systems are provisioned to have ADS-B IN system for 
surveillance, as the “human eye” is absent, it is important to have more robust and effective 
ADS-B system in terms of continuity, availability and integrity. Especially for the class 1 
DAA system, where the surveillance information received from ADS-B In will be utilized 
by DAIDALUS to trigger alerts. Although class 1 DAA will have air to air Radar for 
noncooperative traffic and Mode S surveillance system to get the overall picture of the 
airspace, as a single system ADS-B In needs to be more resilient to signal and message 
loss. This study only made use of Ground Receiver Data, which may not provide a 
complete scenario of air to air data anomalies. The characteristics and the vulnerabilities 
might be less or more severe for air to air than air to ground. Hence, a data anomaly study 
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for air to air received data is recommended. Also, this research found that no two flights 
are same. There is difference in the anomalies in different flights, thus a periodic check of 
ADS-B system might be beneficial if the detected anomalies appeared on regular basis. It 
is a matter of interest that if the real-time anomalies differ from the anomalies detected in 
the archived data. One of the future extension of this work can be compare the real time 
recorded ADS-B data and raw pass through data.  
The information and results presented in this document can be used by developers of DAA 
logic for UAS and autonomous ATC systems. For full utilization of airspace, 
understanding the anomalies of ADS-B and knowing how to deal and handle these 
anomalies is crucial. As ADS-B is envisioned to lead future ATC, provision should be 


















filename= 'outfile_Dec15.xlsx';  %name of the file 
adsb_data=xlsread(filename,'A:AG'); %33 column data extracted from 
archived data 
  




 for i=2:m 
    if adsb_data(i+1,1)> 500 & adsb_data(i,1)< 500  
        adsb_data(i+1,1)= adsb_data(i,1); 
    else if  adsb_data(i+1,1)< 500  
             adsb_data(i+1,1)= adsb_data(i+1,1); 
        end 
    end 
      
 end 
  
  for i=2:m 
    if adsb_data(i+1,4)> 86400 & adsb_data(i,4)< 86400 
        adsb_data(i+1,4)= adsb_data(i,4); 
    else if  adsb_data(i+1,4)< 86400  
             adsb_data(i+1,4)= adsb_data(i+1,4); 
        end 
    end 
      
end 
  
 adsb_data = adsb_data(~any(isnan(adsb_data),2),:);   
  
%% filter ICAO addressed aircraft 





     if adsb_data(i,5)~=0  %address qualifier data is availble in 
column 5 and the value for ICAO is 0 
         adsb_data(i,5)=-999; 
    end   
end 
  
rows_to_remove = any(adsb_data==-999, 2); 




%% Remove all ground aircraft 
  






     if adsb_data(i,9)== 1;  %a/g state data is saved in coumn 9, 1 
indicate the aircraft is on ground 
         adsb_data(i,9)=-999; 
    end   
end 
  
rows_to_remove = any(adsb_data==-999, 2); 
adsb_data(rows_to_remove,:) = []; 
  






adsb_data( :, all( isnan( adsb_data ), 1 ) ) = []; 
  









     if adsb_data(i,4)~=1  %type code is availble in column 4 and the 
value for long message is 1 
         adsb_data(i,4)=-999; 
    end   
end 
  
rows_to_remove = any(adsb_data==-999, 2); 


















%matrix into a cell array based on the aricraft ID number 
adsb_split=arrayfun(@(x)  all_report(all_report(:,6) == x, :), unique( 
all_report(:,6)), 'uniformoutput',false); 
  





    adsb_split{j}= sortrows(adsb_split{j},1); 
    [r c]=size(adsb_split{j}); 
    
        for i=1:r 
             
            if i==1 
                adsb_split{j}(i,24)=0; 
            else  
                adsb_split{j}(i,24)=adsb_split{j}(i,1)-adsb_split{j}(i-
1,1); 
                if adsb_split{j}(i,24)>= 900   %different flight 
                    adsb_split{j}(i,24)=0; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
end 
  





     
   
   [r c]= size(adsb_split{j}); 
   if r==0; 
       continue 
   end 
   no_drop=0; 
   drop_3=0; %less than or equal to 3 seconds update 
   drop_5=0; %less than or equal to 5 seconds update 
   drop_15=0; %less than or equal to 15 seconds update 
   drop_30=0; %less than or equal to 30 seconds update 
   drop_60=0; %less than or equal to 60 seconds update 
   drop_120=0; %less than or equal to 120 seconds update 
   drop_300=0; %less than or equal to 300 seconds update 
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   more_300=0; %more than 300 seconds 
   airb=0; 
   out_range=0; 
   anom=0; 
   dur_1=0; 
   dur_3=0; 
   dur_5=0; 
   dur_15=0; 
   dur_30=0; 
   dur_60=0; 
   dur_120=0; 
   dur_300=0; 
   dur_m=0; 
   dur_o=0; 
   id= adsb_split{j}(1,6); 
  
   for i=1:r 
        if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=2; 
            no_drop=no_drop+1; 
            dur_1=dur_1+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
        else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=3 && adsb_split{j}(i,24)>2 ; 
                drop_3=drop_3+1; 
                dur_3=dur_3+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
        else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=5 && adsb_split{j}(i,24)>3 ; 
                drop_5=drop_5+1; 
                dur_5=dur_5+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
            else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=15 && adsb_split{j}(i,24)>5; 
                    drop_15=drop_15+1; 
                    dur_15=dur_15+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
                else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=30 && 
adsb_split{j}(i,24)>15; 
                        drop_30=drop_30+1; 
                        dur_30=dur_30+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
                    else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=60 && 
adsb_split{j}(i,24)>30; 
                            drop_60=drop_60+1; 
                            dur_60=dur_60+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
                        else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=120 && 
adsb_split{j}(i,24)>60; 
                                drop_120=drop_120+1; 
                                dur_120=dur_120+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
                            else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=300 && 
adsb_split{j}(i,24)>120; 
                                    drop_300=drop_300+1; 
                                    
dur_300=dur_300+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
                                else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)<=900 && 
adsb_split{j}(i,24)>300; 
                                        more_300=more_300+1; 
                                        
dur_m=dur_m+adsb_split{j}(i,24); 
                                    else if adsb_split{j}(i,24)> 900  
                                            out_range=out_range+1; %out 
range <900 
                                            
dur_o=dur_o+adsb_split{j}(i,24); %out of range duration 
                                        end 
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                                    end 
                                end 
                            end 
                        end 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
          end 
        end 
  duration=sum(adsb_split{j}(:,24)); %total flight time 
  end 
    
  
   
       
   contents=[id, no_drop,dur_1, drop_3+ 
drop_5,dur_3+dur_5,drop_15,dur_15,drop_30,dur_30,drop_60,dur_60,drop_12
0,dur_120,drop_300,dur_300,more_300,dur_m,out_range,dur_o,duration];    
    
   total=[old;contents]; 



























count_60,dur_60a, count_120,dur_120a, count_300,dur_300a, 











   [r c]= size(discrepancy_split{i}); 
   no_gap=0; %no discrepancy 
   gap_25=0; % 25 feet discrepany 
   gap_50=0; %discrepancy 25-50 
   gap_100=0; %discrepancy 25-50 
   gap_200=0; %discrepancy 25-50 
   gap_350=0; %discrepancy 25-50 
   gap_500=0; %discrepancy 25-50 
   gap_more=0; %discrepancy 25-50 
   
   id= discrepancy_split{i}(1,4); 
    
   for j=1:r 
       if discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)==0; 
               no_gap=no_gap+1; 
           else if (discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>0 && 
discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)<=25) 
                   gap_25=gap_25+1; 
               else if (discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>25 && 
discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)<=50) 
                       gap_50=gap_50+1; 
                   else if (discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>50 && 
discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)<=100) 
                           gap_100=gap_100+1; 
                       else if (discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>100 && 
discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)<=200) 
                               gap_200=gap_200+1; 
                           else if (discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>200 && 
discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)<=350) 
                                   gap_350=gap_350+1; 
                               else if (discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>350 
&& discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)<=500) 
                                       gap_500=gap_500+1; 
                                   else 
(discrepancy_split{i}(j,11)>500) 
                                       gap_more=gap_more+1; 
                                   end 
                               end 
                           end 
                       end 
                   end 
               end 
           end 
            
  
   end 
    
    








outfile = 'discrepancy.xlsx'; 










    n_count=size(discrepancy_split{i,1}); 
    for j=1:n_count(1,1) 
        if discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,20)< 250 
            level=[level;discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,:)]; 
            
        else if discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,19)==0 && 
discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,20)>= 250 
                ascend=[ascend;discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,:)]; 
            else if  discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,19)==1 && 
discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,20)>= 250 
                    descend=[descend; discrepancy_split{i,1}(j,:)]; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
%% sorting for different aircraft 
level_split=arrayfun(@(x) level(level(:,6) == x, :), unique( 
level(:,6)), 'uniformoutput',false); 
ascend_split=arrayfun(@(x) ascend(ascend(:,6) == x, :), unique( 
ascend(:,6)), 'uniformoutput',false); 
descend_split=arrayfun(@(x) descend(descend(:,6) == x, :), unique( 
descend(:,6)), 'uniformoutput',false); 
 
%% for descend flight calculating mean avg and max deviation for each 





     
    [m n]=size(descend_split{i,1}); 
    if m<30 
        continue 
    else  
        XData=descend_split{i,1}(:,10); 
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        YData=descend_split{i,1}(:,11); 
        [Err P]=fit_2D_data(XData, YData); 
        avg=mean(abs(descend_split{i,1}(:,10)-
descend_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
        ma=max(abs(descend_split{i,1}(:,10)-descend_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
        mi=min(abs(descend_split{i,1}(:,10)-descend_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
        fst=descend_split{i,1}(1,10); 
        lst=descend_split{i,1}(m,10); 
        gap=ma-mi; 
        res_2=[res_2; long_split{i,1}(1,6) P avg mi ma gap Err]; 
    end 
         
end 
%% for ascending flight calculating mean avg and max deviation for each 







     
    [m n]=size(descend_split{i,1}); 
    if m<30 
        continue 
    else  
        XData=ascend_split{i,1}(:,10); 
        YData=ascend_split{i,1}(:,11); 
        avg=mean(abs(ascend_split{i,1}(:,10)-ascend_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
        ma=max(abs(ascend_split{i,1}(:,10)-ascend_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
        mi=min(abs(ascend_split{i,1}(:,10)-ascend_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
        [Err P]=fit_2D_data(XData, YData) 
        gap=ma-mi; 
        res_1=[res_1; long_split{i,1}(1,6) P avg mi ma gap Err]; 
    end 
         
end 
 










     
    XData=level_split{i,1}(:,10); 
    YData=level_split{i,1}(:,11); 
    avg=mean(abs(level_split{i,1}(:,10)-level_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
    ma=max(abs(level_split{i,1}(:,10)-level_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
    mi=min(abs(level_split{i,1}(:,10)-level_split{i,1}(:,11))); 
    gap=ma-mi; 
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    res_3=[res_3; level_split{i,1}(1,6)  avg mi ma gap]; 
         
end 
 




% |   Filename           : WCBoundary_Tcpa.m                             
| 
% |   Description        : Well-clear model for penetration         | 
% |   Created by         : C. Munoz, J. Upchurch, A. Narkawicz            






function [ Rz, Tcoa,WCVz, WCV ] = 
WCBrange_Tcpa(DTHR,TCPA,ZTHR,TCOA,s_z, zodot, zidot) 
  
% Inputs:  
%  DTHR       : Horizontal distance thresholds 
%  TCPA       : Time to CPA threshold 
%  ZTHR       : Altitude threshold 
%  TCOA       : Time to co-altitude threshold 
%  (xo,yo,zo) : Ownship eastern, northern, and altitude positions 
%  (xodot,yodot,zodot) : Ownship eastern, northern, and altitude speeds 
%  (xi,yi,zi) : Intruder eastern, northern, and altitude positions 
%  (xidot,yidot,zidot) : Intruder eastern, northern, and altitude 
speeds 
  
% Outputs:  
%  Rxy    : Horiztonal range 
%  Dcpa   : Distance at closest point of approach 
%  Tcpa   : Time to closest point of approach 
%  Rz     : Relative altitude 
%  Tcoa   : Time to co-altitude 
%  WCVxy  : Horizontal well-clear violation 
%  WCVz   : Vertical well-clear violation 
%  WCV    : Well-clear violation 
  
% % absolute position and velocity of ownship 
% s_o = [xo;yo];  
%s_oz = zo;  %  v_o = [xodot;yodot]; 
v_oz = zodot; 
%  
% % absolute position and velocity of intruder 
% s_i = [xi;yi]; 
%s_iz = zi;  %  v_i = [xidot;yidot];  
v_iz = zidot; 
  
% relative position and velocity  
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 %s_z = (s_oz-s_iz); 
 v_z = (v_oz-v_iz); 
  
% horizontal dimension outputs 
  
  
% vertical dimension outputs 
Rz = abs(s_z) % relative altitude 
cz = s_z*v_z; % cz < 0 iff aircraft are converging in vertical plane 
if cz < 0 
    Tcoa = -s_z/v_z; % time to co-altitude 
else 
    Tcoa = -1; 




WCVxy=0;      % keeping horizontal well clear 
  
%================= VERTICAL WELL CLEAR VIOLATION DEFINITION 
=============== 




%================= WELL CLEAR VIOLATION DEFINITION =============== 


















DEMING REGRESSION DETAILS 
 
If  𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏and 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔 are the respective measurement error than  
𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 = 𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏  
𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔 = 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 + 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔  
where 𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏 and 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 depicts the true value. With the fixed and proportional bias (α, β) the 
second measurement system regression equation becomes: 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 and 𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏 are the estimates of true value. 





Multiple measurements within each subject is required to estimate the error ratio. If 𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏  and 
𝑦𝑦�𝑔𝑔 denotes the means of individual replicate than the variance of measurement error for 
barometric and geometric altitude can be expressed as: 
𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏) =

































The sum of squares for weighted approach is  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤 = �𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖)





𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 be the weight of the model. 





1 + 𝜆𝜆 �
2 
As the least squares regression approach minimizes the sum of squares, the biases are 
determined by differentiating 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤 with respect to 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 and 𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔.  
The slope estimate, β is computed as 
𝛽𝛽 =
(𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞𝑤𝑤 − 𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤) + �(𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤 − 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞𝑤𝑤)2 + 4𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤2
2𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤
 
with 𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖�𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤�
2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  











 𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁








And, the intercept α, is estimated as: 
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